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FRENCH FOREST LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION, 1660-1789

PAUL WALDEN BAMFORD

Ohio State University

"I will apply myself from this year henceforth to the management of the forests of my realm, in which disorder is extreme."¹ Such was the resolve of Louis XIV in 1662. The "disorder" to which he referred had persisted in defiance of royal will for well over 300 years. Predecessors had issued scores of statutes intended to preserve royal forests as a source of revenue, for the pleasures of the chase, or as a ship timber resource.² As early as 1376 two royal *ordonnances*, comprising the first French forest code, had been decreed by Charles V,³ though apparently with no great success since Charles VI complained a dozen years later that the forests had been "little inspected and greatly rummaged and damaged."⁴ Royal legislation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries repeatedly prescribed penalties and remedies for abuses in both royal and private woodlands. But "solemn documents with the best intent were but the subject of mockery"; forest decrees quickly became dead letters.⁵ By mid-seventeenth century private forests in France were widely devastated,⁶ while the king's own wood-

lands, it was said, had "diminished by half in the century past."⁷ The *Conseil du Roi* was moved to complain in 1661 that France, "hitherto replete with fine large forests, is today so deforested that timber for the repair of ships is not easily found."⁸ French forests were on the road to destruction in 1662, when Louis XIV took his resolve to stamp out abuse.

No less firm in that resolve was Louis XIV's minister, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, who set in motion in the 1660's the most comprehensive series of forest reforms that France had hitherto known. Colbert's eight years of endeavor after 1661 produced the legal basis for the order and discipline in forest administration that the monarch sought. Never before had royal forest law been enforced with such exactitude and severity. Provincial officials charged with the protection of forests under existing law were shocked and awed by the arrival of royal inquisitors in the provinces, armed with plenary powers to punish those responsible for forest abuse. The unwanted visitors stayed for months, even years, turning over the pages of records, interviewing inhabitants, seeking out evidence of mal-administration or neglect, which they found, in abundance, and ordering reforms in the minister's name. Nor did the forests themselves escape their scrutiny. Louis de Froidour, best known of these zealous inquisitors, inspected dozens of forests in Béarn, Gascony, Guyenne, and Languedoc.⁹ Woe unto the local official who was, or had been, careless of his responsibility. Men were unseated from office, condemned to pay heavy fines, and forced to make restitutions to the king;

¹ Quoted in Pierre Clément, *Histoire de la vie et de l'administration de Colbert* (2 vols., Paris, 1946), 1:67.

² Texts and extracts from early forest laws are printed in: De Saint Yon, *Les Édits et ordonnances . . . des eaux et forêts . . .* (Paris, 1610), texts and tables; Louis de Froidour, *Ordonnances des eaux et forêts . . .* (Toulouse, 1683), texts, 2-161; Baudrillart, *Traité général des eaux et forêts . . . composé d'un recueil chronologique* (2 vols., Paris, 1821-1829), vol. 1; Isambert, *Decrusy*, and Jourdan, *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises* (29 vols., Paris, 1821-1833).

³ *Ordonnance générale sur les forêts royales . . .* (Melun, July 1376); *Lettres portant homologation d'un règlement des maîtres des eaux et forêts* (Paris, September, 1376); Isambert, *Recueil général*, 5:456, 478-479.

⁴ Jean-Baptiste Colbert, *Lettres, instructions et mémoires*, edited by Pierre Clément (8 vols., Paris, 1861-1882), 4:li.

⁵ G. Geneau, "La Législation forestière sous l'ancien régime," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1940), 174.

⁶ Archives de la Marine at the Archives Nationales, Paris (hereafter cited as *Marine*), series G. 121, "Mémoire touchant la Marine" (1650).

⁷ Quoted by Paul Buffault, "Pour la défense des futaies," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1926), 228n.

⁸ Jean de Boislisle, *Mémoires du Conseil de 1661* (3 vols., Paris, 1905-1907), 1:248; 2:61, 68.

⁹ Colbert, *Lettres*, 4:185-187, 195-196, 230, and the *Instruction sur la réformation des forêts* (1663), printed 197-203; Louis de Froidour, *Instruction pour les ventes des bois du Roy* (Toulouse, 1668), *passim*.

some offenders were ordered sent to the galleys "by the first chain," and at least one went to the block." Punitive measures were accompanied by constructive efforts toward reform. The inquisitors reviewed and judged the utility of existing forest regulations, pointed out deficiencies, and framed proposals for supplementary law. Their proposals were studied by a 21-man commission of the king, and were used in developing the *Ordonnance des eaux et forêts* of 1669, the basic code for a century and a half to come.

The preamble to the *Ordonnance* of 1669 expressed confidence that French forests would henceforth provide for all the needs "of private citizens and the necessities of war."¹⁰ Five hundred articles reflected the intention of Colbert and the will of Louis XIV that royal and private forest resources be protected and increased to sustain the monarch, his subjects and their heirs. Not emphasized, but certainly foremost in the framers' minds, was the intention to increase the revenue deriving from royal forest domains and the desire to assure ample domestic supplies of naval timber and masts. To achieve these purposes, the *Ordonnance* prescribed a system of forest management compounded of earlier practices, calling for division of each sizable forest into many compartments, each to be subjected in rotation to felling, with at least 16 trees left standing on each arpent to reseed and renew the growth. One quarter of the forested land in ecclesiastical and communal hands was to be reserved for the production of timber trees.¹¹ To assure adherence to this system of management the existing *maîtrises* of waters and forests were reorganized, each with police and administrative powers, field officers to guard the forests, and special courts to try offenders, all under the supervision of the

minister of finance. In the latter's portfolio lay the obligation to achieve some effective compromise between the dual objects of forest conservation and forest use. The major legal weapon at his command was the *Ordonnance* itself, a forest code which was then supposed to be "precise and certain . . . [a law that] dissipates the obscurity of its predecessors, and no longer leaves pretext or excuse to those who err."¹²

Detailed and precise the *Ordonnance* doubtless was, all 500 articles; but unhappily, as time was to show, the code of 1669 was more perfect in appearance than fact. Intended for general application to all the forested land in France, it admitted "no exception in any province."¹³ The letter of the law thus failed to recognize that proprietors, and peasants especially, were not easily dissuaded from following the dictates of custom and need in cuts of trees. Destructive abuses, such as grazing sheep and goats on forested land, were so widespread and deeply entrenched that even the power of the "Grand Monarch" would be overtaxed in any attempt to root them out at once. As written, the code attempted to go too far too quickly; it promised to run aground on the sands of feudal rights as had most earlier forest statutes. There was at least a temporary need for flexibility in forest law, and for circumspect, gradual progress toward full and universal conformity with the letter of the code. In the light of these needs, many feudal usages proscribed by the law were allowed to persist. In practice, the *Ordonnance* was immediately applied in only part of the realm.¹⁴ But during a long campaign for forest conservation in the succeeding century, enforcement was extended, piecemeal fashion, to include forests and provinces that lay beyond the law's effective initial reach.

This forest conservation campaign in France after 1669 involved hundreds of statutes intended to supplement the *Ordonnance*. At least five types of law can be distinguished. First, attempts were made to remedy certain sylvicultural deficiencies inherent in the basic law. Concurrently, a series of enactments

¹⁰ Colbert, *Lettres*, 4:lviii, 217, 264; A. Campagne, *Les Forêts pyrénées* (Paris, 1912), 50-51; G. Huffel, *Économie forestière* (3 vols., Paris, 1926), 3:149.

¹¹ *Édit portant règlement général pour les eaux et forêts* (Saint-Germain-en-Laye, August 1669), pref. (Hereafter cited as *Ordonnance* of 1669). Isambert, *Recueil général*, 18:219. Concerning defective texts of this *Ordonnance*, see Esmonin, "La Publication et l'impression des ordonnances royales sous l'ancien régime," *Bulletin de la société d'histoire moderne* (1949), 9.

¹² *Ordonnance* of 1669, Titre 24: articles 2-3; 16: article 284, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 18:277-278.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 18:219.

¹⁴ Buffault, "Le Régime forestière de 1669 en Béarn," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1900), 516.

¹⁵ E. Gosselin, *Pierre Corneille (le père), maître des eaux et forêts* (Rouen, 1864), 8; Colbert, *Lettres*, 4:250.

gave spatial extension to enforcement measures; a third series re-enforced and extended naval priority rights over certain types of trees. Fourthly, statutes were issued to regulate industrial consumption and demand. And scattered throughout the whole of this legislative procession was a fifth type of law, condemning to punishment those of the king's subjects who persisted in disobedience.

The first series of laws was rendered necessary by the serious shortcomings of the *Ordonnance* with respect to non-deciduous trees. No special provision was originally made for such trees, in spite of the fact that management methods appropriate for oak and other slow-growing types were unsuited and damaging to such trees as the spruce and fir of the Pyrenees, Alsace, Auvergne, and Dauphiné. Fragmentary corrective legislation was issued shortly after 1669 dealing with certain localities in the Pyrenees, and in 1702 a general statute was issued in the interests of Pyrenees fir.¹⁴ Elsewhere in France, regional forestry officers developed management methods deemed suitable for the peculiar needs of individual provinces or forests, and practicable in the light of local habits of use. Throughout the Vosges of Lorraine, for example, the traditional system of even-age management was largely retained; in the Alsatian Vosges, however, management methods were varied in both royal and private forests to accord with local conditions.¹⁵ In the Jura after 1727 the "code Maclot" was employed, and an imitation of the Maclot methods obtained in Franche-Comté after 1730.¹⁶ Such local adaptations alleviated, but did not eliminate, the damaging effects of technical deficiencies in the law.

The second series of laws—those concerned with the spatial extension of law enforcement—dealt primarily with forests situated in the frontier provinces. Remote from the seat of royal authority or, in some cases, recently acquired by conquest, these provinces presented management problems of special difficulty. In the south, along the Spanish frontier, the autonomous pretensions of the Pyreneans required a long series of royal forest decrees and the creation of a *maitrise* at Pau in 1738.¹⁷ Along the eastern frontier in Dauphiné and Franche-Comté, the *Ordonnance* had to be applied by means of statutes long and often repeated in the face of active opposition.¹⁸ Though "never fully respected," these laws "brought under control many of the pillaging habits which rural populations had had since time immemorial."¹⁹ Enforcement in Alsace was obstructed by the terms of the Peace of Westphalia, which guaranteed to the province all traditional rights and prerogatives in matters forestrial; however, in 1694 two *maitrises* were established in Alsace at Ensisheim and Haguenau, and determined efforts were made to enforce the *Ordonnance* until the turn of the century; thereafter, provincial intendants exercised controls and issued numerous enforcement regulations.²⁰

On the northern frontier, in Hainault, part of which was acquired by France in 1678, French forest law was immediately applied; but with the support of their clergy, the inhabitants solicited and obtained exemption in 1706. Widespread abuses ensued and the law was reinvoked in 1724, only to be withdrawn again in 1727.²¹ The forest of Rochefort, near the city and naval dockyard of that name, was entirely excluded from the protective jurisdiction of the *Ordonnance* because Michel Begon, intendant of Rochefort, believed that the proximity of this forest was "one of the causes for the unhealthfulness of the city," an opinion shared by the minister of finance, Pontchartrain, who authorized total extinction of the forest. In 1702, however, Begon reversed his earlier opinions on urban health and guards for the forest of Rochefort were brought in from the neighboring *maitrise* of Niort; and a year later a new *maitrise* was organized to protect what remained of the

la forêt dans la vie des populations franc-comtoises . . . 1674-1789," *Études sur l'histoire administrative et sociale de l'ancien régime*, edited by Georges Pagès (Paris, 1938), 165.

¹⁴ Buffault, "Le Régime forestière," 517, 519.

¹⁵ Archives de la Marine at Toulon (hereafter cited as Marine: Toulon), series 11, vol. 435, "Mémoire concernant les abus qu'il y a dans les bois de la Province de Dauphiné" (1750); Alfred Roy, "Pour servir à l'histoire forestière du Dauphiné: La Réformation Générale de 1724-1732," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1935), 24ff.; Barthélémy, "Étude sur une ancienne réformation générale des forêts dans la province du Dauphiné," *Bulletin de l'Académie Dauphinoise* (1906), 196ff.

¹⁶ Monniot, "La Rôle de la forêt," 172.

¹⁷ Huffel, *Économie forestière*, 3:198n.

¹⁸ B° 92 (Marine) fols. 157-163; D° 8 (Marine) fol. 72.

¹⁴ Huffel, *Économie forestière*, 3:158-159, 196ff., 265.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 3:196-199.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3:201-202; Suzanne Monniot, "Le Rôle de

forest and to extend the application of law in nearby Saintonge and Aunis.²⁴ As these examples suggest, efforts to broaden the application of forest law made slow progress in many localities and remarkably little in others. Yet a large measure of success was achieved in royal forests, where management practices, by the end of the old regime, generally conformed to the prescriptions of the forest code.

Less numerous, but more successful, were the royal statutes intended to preserve trees suitable for naval use. The *Ordonnance* itself conferred priorities on the navy, including a lien on all wood cut in royal forests, rights to all timber trees standing within ten leagues of the sea and two of navigable rivers, and the privilege of marking suitable trees with the arms of the king as naval reserve.²⁵ In the decades after 1669 numerous *arrêts*, *déclarations*, and *édits* reiterated and extended these priorities, and in 1700 an *arrêt du conseil* brought this fragmentary legislation together as a comprehensive law. Loopholes remained, by which proprietors could escape compliance, but the major flaws were mended, finally, by the *arrêt* of 1748.²⁶ Thereafter a scattering of new laws, carrying down to 1789, reiterated the old and exhorted against continuing abuses of naval rights.²⁷ Judging from the repetitive character of these statutes, it appears certain that they were called forth by the continued incidence of illegal abuse. Nevertheless, naval priorities were probably respected as faithfully as any forest laws of the old regime. Not only the *maîtrises* of waters and forests, but the navy itself supervised their enforcement. Naval priority rights were sustained with sufficient rigor, after mid-eighteenth century, to arouse a stream of bitter complaints from forest proprietors who did not want to sell their timber to the navy, but dared not disobey the law.²⁸

²⁴ J. T. Viala et E.-J. Fleury, *Histoire de la ville et du port de Rochefort* (2 vols., Rochefort, 1845), 1:165-167.

²⁵ *Ordonnance* of 1669, Titre 21:articles 1-3, 26: article 8, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 18:270-271, 284.

²⁶ *Arrêt du Conseil*, September 21, 1700 and July 23, 1748, *Archives Nationales* (hereafter cited as *Arch. Nat.*), series AD.VII, vol. 1.

²⁷ *Arrêt* of July 23, 1754, March 1, 1757, February 8, 1767, and the *Règlement* of December 16, 1786, Baudrillart, *Traité général*, 1:371-372, 405-406, 441-442.

²⁸ D³ 5 (Marine) fol. 63, 88; D³ 3 (Marine) fol. 184.

The fourth type of royal forest legislation after 1669 included various measures intended to control industrial consumption of forest resources. The forests not only provided the timber used in the construction of commercial buildings and shipping, and wood products of countless varieties for the manufacture of implements, machines, containers, and vehicles of every kind, but also the principal industrial fuel. Until the sixteenth century the state gave some encouragement to the proprietors of wood-fuel industries to establish furnaces in or near royal forests and to satisfy their needs with the product of royal forest cuts, but as forest depletion gradually increased and industry expanded, royal antagonism to the inroads of industrial consumers developed.²⁹ Urban centers were the earliest and most articulate antagonists of industrial forest use, and the most vehement proponents of royal restrictions. Municipal administrators often denounced the forge and furnace owners in their hinterland, sometimes prevented the erection of new establishments, and anxiously sought the closure of established manufactories. Provincial *parlements* re-enforced the restrictive measures of the towns, as in Burgundy, where manufactories were "strictly limited" in the seventeenth century.³⁰ But by the opening of the eighteenth, complaints were widespread and the monarch was being called upon from many quarters to act.³¹ The state, however, was torn between the need for forest conservation and the desire to encourage industrial growth. Royal legislation of a general character regulating industrial consumption was not issued until 1723. An *arrêt* in that year forbade "the establishment of any new furnaces, martinet, forges or glass works," or the enlargement of existing establishments, without letters patent. Thereafter, patents were not often issued unless fuel was obtainable from sources distant from cities and navigable streams.³² Numerous royal decrees

²⁹ *Ordonnances* of July 1376 and July 1403, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 5:465, 7:69; W. C. Scoville, *Capitalism and French Glassmaking, 1640-1789* (Berkeley, 1950), 57.

³⁰ Scoville, *Capitalism and French Glassmaking*, 58; Bertrand Gille, *Les Origines de la grande industrie métallurgique en France* (Paris, 1947), 73.

³¹ Arthur de Boislisle, *Correspondance des contrôleurs généraux des finances* (3 vols., Paris, 1874-1897), 2:80-81, 100-102.

³² Pierre Brunet, "Sylviculture et technique des

in the years 1725-1740 forced the removal of the Languedocian glass industry into mountainous areas and thus "practically destroyed the industry."²² After mid-century, however, the state generally chose less drastic, but more constructive lines of policy, as exemplified by the *arrêt du conseil* of 1744 giving strong encouragement to the coal industry to provide a fuel substitute for wood.²³

The fifth type of legislation, punitive in intent, dealt with various classes of offenses; multiple and individual instances of abuse were alike condemned to punishment by royal decrees. The French clergy, "most vigorous" in opposition to royal forest law and negligent in its application, was condemned in 1693 to pay a penalty of 4,600,000 livres for its recalcitrance. That the clergy still did not comply with the letter of the law is evident from many *arrêts* in the eighteenth century, such as that of 1754 "renewing very express prohibitions" that many ecclesiastics had ignored.²⁴ Non-ecclesiastical landowners were no less recalcitrant. In 1691 an order was issued "for the seizure of 275 oaks that Madame la Duchesse de Nemours had cut" illegally; two years later, on the same grounds, 75 oaks were confiscated from another culprit and a fine was ordered paid.²⁵ During the *réformation* of forests in the *maîtrise* at Arques in the years 1732-34, 51 persons were condemned to pay fines totaling 100,000 livres, of which the share of the Marquis de la Londe was 63,000.²⁶

Perhaps the best commentary on the effectiveness of the law was the state of French forests at the end of the old régime. Condi-

tions naturally varied from province to province, but cries of alarm were then being raised in extraordinary profusion. Memoirists went so far as to assert that wood had "become very rare in France," that the forests were "approaching total destruction," and that France was menaced by "total want of wood."²⁷ Though such general alarms can hardly be credited, acute local evidences of shortage were certainly abundant in the 1780's.²⁸ Forges in many localities had been forced to reduce production or close for lack of fuel. From most intendants came pessimistic reports pointing to the grave and worsening depletion of forests. The navy, whose resources had been better protected by law than those of other users, had been forced by 1783 to a position of dependence on imported timber supplies.²⁹ There can be no doubt that the process of forest depletion had advanced rapidly during the eighteenth century, and by 1789 there was considerable justification for describing the situation as "extremely grave."³⁰ Royal conservation measures, intended to forestall depletion by controlling production and consumption, had failed.

Explanation for this failure should be prefaced by stressing that forest administration, though troublesome for the ministers of finance, was one of the least of their many concerns; virtually the entire complex of internal administration in France lay in their hands, and the burden, in the eighteenth century, would have taxed even the energies of a Colbert. The ministers and the forestry officers under their control were quite alive to the progress of forest depletion, but were unable to do much more than continue to legislate and punish in the customary manner. They were also aware that the French

forges," *Annales de Bourgogne* (1930), 344ff.; Scoville, *Capitalism and French Glassmaking*, 60-63; Courtivron, "Sur la nécessité de perfectionner la métallurgie des forges," *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences* (1747), 287-288.

²² Scoville, *Capitalism and French Glassmaking*, 60. Cf. B³ 418 (Marine) fol. 221-225.

²³ Marcel Rouff, *Les Mines de charbon en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1922), chap. 4; Henri Séé, *Histoire économique de la France* (2 vols., Paris, 1939), 1:360-361.

²⁴ Geneau, "La Législation forestière," 164-165; *Arrêt du conseil*, July 23, 1754, Baudrillart, *Traité général*, 1:371-372.

²⁵ *Arrêts du conseil*, June 19, 1691, February 24, 1693, Baudrillart, *Traité général*, 1:117, 121.

²⁶ M. de la Serre, "La Réformation général de la maîtrise d'Arques," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1925), 113.

²⁷ D² 3 (Marine) "Mémoire concernant les différentes causes de la dégradation des bois," November 8, 1776; D² 15 (Marine) "Mémoire et observations sur l'état actuel des forêts," December 12, 1776.

²⁸ Gille, *Les Origines . . . industrie métallurgique*, 70-76; Henri Séé, "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement en Bretagne à la fin de l'ancien régime," *Annales de Bretagne* (1924), 16-18, 362; Théophile Malvèzin, *Histoire du commerce de Bordeaux* (2 vols., Bordeaux, 1892), 3:145-146.

²⁹ Gille, *Les Origines . . . industrie métallurgique*, 70-76; D² 2 (Marine) fol. 174; 1L 435 (Marine: Toulon), Castries to Fabry and Malouet, January 19, 1783.

³⁰ Gille, *Les Origines . . . industrie métallurgique*, 76.

forest code, while prescribing many of the most advanced management practices then known in forest science, was not without serious defects. Natural scientists and many local forestry officers suggested reforms calculated to remedy these defects and help arrest depletion.⁴ Their suggestions were reinforced by the continual criticism of forest proprietors and the navy.⁵ Under this pressure the ministers adopted a number of drastic measures before mid-eighteenth century, notably *réformations généraux* in individual provinces, intended to crush abuses, enforce the established system of management, and institute reforms. Such efforts were marked by some success. But they were costly, and the financial problems with which the ministers were obliged to deal became more acute later in the century.⁶ Hence most of these *réformations* were undertaken before 1740; for financial reasons, few were initiated after mid-century, though forest abuse and depletion was then most acute.

Needed reforms in forest management were not, and in some instances, could not be made. Some of the defects inherent in the *Ordonnance*, as has been shown, were remedied; others persisted. In 1721 the naturalist Réaumur pointed to serious imperfections in the code; the *Ordonnance* of 1669, he warned, was "a poor resource for reforesting the realm with full-grown trees," and many of his learned contemporaries shared that view.⁷ The law failed, for technical reasons, to provide adequate means for replenishing woodlands after cuts. The cuts allowed by the *Ordonnance* were too nearly total; too few trees were reserved for seeding purposes. Particularly was this the case when the law was applied in deciduous forests on mountainous or hilly terrain. There, natural obstacles to reproduction were greatest and a

large reserve was required for replenishment after cuts. Royal regulations actually encouraged invasions of fast-growing "whitewood," like birch, that tended to choke out slow-growing seedlings and sprouts from stumps beneath, thus bringing on qualitative deterioration of the growing stock. Nor did the law provide for intermediary cuts, spaced between primary fellings, to clear out this brush and "whitewood" that gradually took possession of wooded land in many regions.⁸ The law thus failed not only to provide for satisfactory reproduction, but also to protect seedlings and young trees when they were produced. With each of these deficiencies taking its toll in turn, *futaie* (lofty trees) were understandably "becoming very rare," as Réaumur remarked in 1721, adding that such trees will certainly "continue to diminish if no recourse is had to new expedients for the conservation of coppice."⁹ Some corrective measures were taken in the eighteenth century, when new nurseries were established and seedlings were set out in many royal forests.¹⁰ Yet during much of the period 1660-1789 the defective management practices that the law encouraged and actually prescribed allowed depletion and deterioration to take place even when the law was enforced.

But since the forest code often was not enforced it was in the administration of this system of management that the most damaging shortcomings made themselves felt. Administrative difficulties were multiplied by the complexity and unpopularity of the laws. Royal forest regulations mirrored the labyrinth of feudal usages that they proscribed in whole or part; in detail they reflected the ingrained Colbertist propensity to over-regulate. The bureaucratic formalities they prescribed seemed unnecessary; necessary or not, they proved obnoxious to many private forest proprietors and were often ignored. Since

⁴ D^o 15 (Marine) fol. 115; Réaumur, "Réflexions sur l'état de bois," *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences* (1721), 286ff.; Lucien Turc, "L'Aménagement des bois de sapin de Franche-Comté," *Revue forestière* (1950), 455.

⁵ D^o 3 (Marine) fol. 183-186; D^o 15 (Marine) fol. 61-64, 112-115, 187-188; D^o 2 (Marine) fol. 131, 175-176.

⁶ The forest reformation in Franche-Comté in the years 1726-1740, for example, "cost dearly and finished in haste." Turc, "L'Aménagement des bois," 455.

⁷ Réaumur, "Réflexions," 286. Cf. Duhamel du Monceau, *De l'exploitation de bois* (2 vols., Paris, 1764), 1:136.

⁸ Huffel, *Economie forestière*, 3:155, 180-181, 184-185. Regenerative cutting was practiced, but *bois blanc* spread widely nevertheless.

⁹ Réaumur, "Réflexions," 285-286.

¹⁰ F^o 256 (Arch. Nat.) "Mémoire sur l'état des pépinières" (1756); R. Blais, "Buffon pépiniériste," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1935). See remarks that ill-success discouraged forest owners able to undertake seeding and planting. "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement," 369. Cf. F. Vazeilles, "Le Reboisement des montagnes et les pépinières forestières en Auvergne avant 1789," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1925), 269-270.

they infringed on the customs and habits of individuals, towns, and corporations alike, forest regulations "had the immense disgrace of displeasing nearly everyone," and displeasure led to disobedience on a thousand pretexts.¹² Resistance, stubborn in many areas, was most stubborn in those provinces recently acquired by France. Some provincial *parlements* refused to register the *Ordonnance* until forced to do so by peremptory royal command.¹³ Provincial pretensions to autonomy re-enforced feudal claims to untrammelled rights of forest use. The effectiveness of forest law tended to decrease as the physical distance from Versailles increased. In Béarn, for example, repeated *arrêtés* availed nothing; the *Ordonnance* "remained a dead letter" from 1669 until 1738, and even then was bitterly resisted by the *États de Béarn* which sought for 20 years to have the enforcement agency, the *maîtrise* at Pau, suppressed.¹⁴ To this end they bribed the Maréchal de Noailles with 6,000 livres and 200 bottles of wine, and in 1756 they plied the first clerk of the navy department with 12 hams and two barrels of tasty goose legs, all to no avail.¹⁵ The forest code was so little known or observed in the Pyrénées that when attempts were made in the early nineteenth century to invigorate the ordinances, an insurrection broke out, *la guerre des demoiselles*, having as its object resistance to the application of forest law.¹⁶ An enormous amount of evidence points to the difficulties of administration in the face of local resistance in most parts of France.¹⁷

The application of royal regulations was of course least effective in private and communal forest holdings, where the powers of the *maître* were most restricted and where his

¹² L. F. Tessier, "L'Idée forestière dans l'histoire," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1905), 13.

¹³ A. Granger, "Essai sur la législation forestière de 1789 à 1827," *Revue des eaux et forêts* (1943), 453.

¹⁴ Buffault, "Le Régime forestière," 517, 519.

¹⁵ Henri de Coigny, "Jean de Laclede: Maître particulier des eaux et forêts à Pau," *Bulletin de la société des sciences, lettres, et arts de Pau* (1926), 25, 57-58.

¹⁶ Campagne, *Les Forêts pyrénéennes*, 65.

¹⁷ On provincial resistance: F° 408 (Arch. Nat.) "Observations" by Grignon (1778); D. VI. 56 (Arch. Nat.) dossier 913, "Traité" by Galonière (1787). Many examples in the works of Buffault, Barthélémy, Alaux et Canaby, Mazoyer, Roy, Ture, Monniot, herein cited.

supervisory functions were least exercised. Royal forests were the primary responsibility of the *maîtres*; their duties with respect to all other forest resources were distinctly secondary. Conditions varied from *maîtrise* to *maîtrise*, of course, but the regulations to which private forest owners objected so strenuously were in fact far less rigid, precise, and thorough than those which applied to royal domains. It was expected that the owners of private forests would, as the *Ordonnance* specifically authorized, establish their own system of forest police to prevent illicit depredations by their neighbors, especially the peasantry. The proprietor himself was subject to surveillance by the *grand-maître* and other responsible officers who were permitted by law to inspect private forests at will, with full authority to repress abuses.¹⁸ But in practice, inspection visits were infrequently made. Administrative duties related to royal forest administration tended to preoccupy, even to demobilize, the *grand-maître* and most of his subordinates. In an age when tours of forest inspection involved extreme discomforts in travel and unaccustomed physical labor during the actual inspection of trees, the obligation to inspect did not often attract the *maîtres* from the comforts of the provincial town; it was an uncommon reutier who frequently burdened himself with the inspection chore in private forests. "Generally," as one memoirist observed in 1776, "the functions of [forestry officers] . . . are confined to that which concerns the forests of the King and those woodlands in the hands of *mainmortables*." These were "the only forests overseen"; those belonging to towns and individuals "are never inspected."¹⁹ These observations overstated the case perhaps, yet the combination of easy-going venal forest officers and recalcitrant proprietors allowed much abuse to go unpunished and even delayed the application of law in many communal forests until the end of the eighteenth century.²⁰ When the enforcement of royal regulations proceeded on a more or less voluntary basis, as in private holdings in most localities, many factors minimized the effectiveness of law.

¹⁸ *Ordonnance* of 1669, *Titre 26*: articles 2, 5; 24: article 12, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 18: 280, 284.

¹⁹ D° 3 (Marine) fols. 182-183.

²⁰ Monniot, "Le Role de la forêt," 167.

No less damaging to the effectiveness of royal regulations, in the conservation of private and royal forests alike, was the difficulty of obtaining dependable and competent officials for the forest service. The ministers of finance were hard-pressed by the need for funds. Under this pressure the offices of *grand-maitre*, that Colbert had given gratuitously to his collaborators, were again rendered venal and hereditary shortly after his death (1683), and in 1707 "the financial distress of the monarchy led to the creation of alternative [forestry] offices."⁶⁰ The venality of these posts created great mischief. Men who purchased their offices could only be removed by a process of judicial condemnation, and there was an ample crop of incumbents who lacked competence or honesty or both, and who should have been but could not easily be removed. "Charged with the conservation of forests, [they] contributed to their ruin by their incompetence, their negligence, and the abuses of which they were guilty."⁶¹ Letters patent ordering reformation of Auvergne forests in 1725 condemned "the negligence of officers of the *maitrises*" as a major cause of devastation.⁶² No less guilty were the forestry officers of Dauphiné: "there is no province where the forests are in worse condition as a result of disobedience . . . and criminal negligence by officers of the *maitrise*."⁶³ In Franche-Comté, the forests "sustained the gravest damages with the complicity of local officers."⁶⁴ Naval officials interested in Provençal forests as a source of timber for Toulon were bitter critics of the Chamber of Waters and Forests at Aix: "Of all the causes which have occasioned and daily cause abuses prejudicial to the forests of Provence . . . , the most important is . . .

⁶⁰ Huffel, "Les Méthodes de l'aménagement forestier en France," *Annales de l'école nationale des eaux et forêts* (1927), 80. Cf. Roland Mousnier, *La Vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Rouen, n.d.), 22.

⁶¹ Sée, "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement," 375.

⁶² E. Rouganne, *Le Commerce des bois dans la Basse-Auvergne* (Paris, 1932), 16. Buffault emphasizes, "above all, lack of surveillance and control" as a cause of depletion. "Le Régime forestière," 525.

⁶³ Barthélémy, "Étude sur une ancienne réformation générale," 199.

⁶⁴ Mazoyer, "Exploitation forestière et conflits sociaux en Franche-Comté à la fin de l'ancien régime," *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale* (1932), 341.

that of having permitted the Parlement of Aix to buy the *Grand Maitrise*.⁶⁵ The daily commission of forest abuses, said the *trésorier* at Rochefort, is "the fault of officers of enforcement, who fail to execute the regulations exactly and rigidly in accord with the objects for which they were drawn."⁶⁶ Such criticism should be tempered by stress on the fact that the period 1669-1789 saw many competent men occupy these high places in the forest service, men more devoted and capable than most of their sixteenth and seventeenth century predecessors. Yet there can be no doubt that many rascals among them left records of widespread and damaging corruption, mal-administration, and neglect.

Nor was administrative corruption confined to the higher ranks of officialdom; lower echelon functionaries under the jurisdiction of the *maitre* had more reason than some of their superiors for indulging in illegal practices. Like their superiors, many men in the lower grades purchased their offices, but unlike the *maitres* they were strongly encouraged to lax and dishonest practices by the meagreness of their remuneration. Under the terms of the *Ordonnance* of 1669 forest guards were entitled to a small percentage of fines collected from convicted offenders; these extraordinary gratuities were added to the small base salary attaching to their office.⁶⁷ The salaries of these guards ranged from 80 to 120 livres per annum when, as estimated by Henri Sée, their food alone cost 200 livres a year.⁶⁸ "This abuse," one memoirist remarked, "is the germ of all others . . . an invincible obstacle to the replenishment of forests."⁶⁹ To increase such salaries, which the ministers were repeatedly urged to do, evidently did not appear consistent with economical administration. Under the circumstances, as one eighteenth century memoirist observed, the guard who was "honest and always loyal" was indeed "a citizen of rare and superior generosity to his state."⁷⁰ Offi-

⁶⁵ IL 435 (Marine: Toulon), "Mémoire" dated February 26, 1750, and "Plaintes" (1739); G. 75 (Marine), Maurepas to Parlement de Provence, September 15, 1723.

⁶⁶ D² 2 (Marine) fol. 134.

⁶⁷ D² 15 (Marine) fol. 112-113.

⁶⁸ Sée, "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement," 14. Cf. D² 14 (Marine), fol. 96.

⁶⁹ D² 15 (Marine) fol. 112.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 113; Mazoyer, "Exploitation forestière," 341-342.

cers of the forest service closed their eyes to abuses; they accepted bribes and were known to be guilty of furtive cuts and sales of wood from the forests they were supposed to guard.⁶⁰ The timber merchant who sought to acquire valuable hardwoods by illegal means could scarcely have found these guards incorruptible. When offenders were brought to trial, the forest guard might well be aligned on the defendant's side.

The venality of offices and the low salaries paid to most members of the forest service underscored the fact that after Colbert's death royal forests were administered less as a public trust than as a source of revenue. The increase of income from the royal domains had been one of Colbert's aims, yet he had held in view the necessity of long-term conservation policies. His successors in the ministry of finance, who faced greater and continually increasing financial pressure, were led to compromise long-term policy by accepting expedients that would produce immediate funds; for them the quest for revenue became the dominant theme in forest administration, and financial needs were served, not only by low salaries and the sale of offices, but by increasing the frequency and severity of cuts in royal forests, and by transferring royal forests to private hands.

Although the principal motive for heavy cuts was the desire for larger revenue, several factors concurred in the eighteenth century to encourage such practices. The growing demand for forest products and the incidence of serious local shortages produced agitation for a lower age of exploitation, sometimes on the allegation that shortage "was occasioned by the modicity of cuts in His Majesty's forests."⁶¹ Some French forest officers urged that seeding trees should be cut at a lower age because when older, such trees "are like women who become sterile in old age."⁶² The invasion of birch and other "white-woods," which the defective system of management widely encouraged, tended to justify and bring about more rapid rotations of cuts. Many circumstances encouraged heavier cuts, and for financial reasons the state contributed powerfully to the tendency. To cite a few, among scores of instances, the royal for-

est of Vierzon, where the exploitation age ranged from 150 to 200 years in Colbert's day, was almost entirely reduced by 1780 to coppice with an exploitation age of 35 years in 1779. Exploitations in the great forest of Haguenau were fixed in 1674 at 200 years, reduced to 150 years in 1750, and stood at not more than 60 in 1782. Royal revenue from this forest consequently increased from 28,000 livres in 1720 to 37,000 in 1750, reaching 200,000 in 1784, and standing at 226,000 annually between 1785-87. Motives of a financial order were well served by such exploitation methods, but the long-term interests of the forests certainly were not. Writing in 1926, Huffel remarked that many French forests, "and not the least important, still feel today" the effects of these excessive cuts.⁶³

The financial pressure which encouraged heavier cuts also led the ministers of finance to transfer royal forest domains to private control. There were legal barriers to transfer in the case of some domains,⁶⁴ but the question of legality became academic in 1691 when all cessions of royal domains that had been made since 1566 were recognized as permanent on condition that payment of ten per cent of their value was made to the Crown.⁶⁵ In that same year, a large forest was ceded "temporarily" to an *engagiste*, and with the transfer went the right to clear those portions suitable for agricultural use.⁶⁶ The next century saw a long series of such alienations. By no means all alienations conferred rights to clear the land. Indeed, an *arrêt* of 1716 forbade clearings by the *engagiste*.⁶⁷ However, many forests granted as appanage were reduced from *futaie* to coppice *sous futaie* and further damage was done in some instances by the erection of industrial establishments near the appanage with rights to exploit the coppice, to increase the revenue of the *apanagiste*.⁶⁸ In the last two decades of the old regime, the desperate aggravation of Bourbon financial difficulties occasioned a

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 3:183-185 with notes.

⁶¹ The *Ordonnance of Moulins* (1566), *Ordonnance of 1669, Titre 27: article 1*, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 18: 284-285.

⁶² *Edit of October 1691, ibid.*, 20, 141.

⁶³ A. de Boislisle, *Correspondance*, 1: 265, 277.

⁶⁴ *Arrêt du conseil*, July 4, 1716, Isambert, *Recueil général*, 21:120.

⁶⁵ Granger, "Essai sur la législation forestière," 454.

⁶⁰ D^r 15 (Marine) fol. 118; Sée, "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement," 15-16.

⁶¹ Huffel, *Économie forestière*, 3:183-184.

⁶² Quoted in *ibid.*, 3:182.

number of very substantial alienations which did include cutting rights. The years 1770-1775, for example, saw the transfer of a royal forest of 17,200 acres to the King's brother for 1,585,000 livres, a forest that was entirely cleared for conversion to the plow.⁷⁰ In the same period the royal forest of Beaufort, in Anjou, "populated by vigorous oak 40 to 50 feet in height," was sold (1771) and by 1780 Beaufort was entirely cleared.⁷¹ An estimated 883,000 arpents were alienated to various categories of *engagiste* during the century before 1789, and in many of those revenue-inspired alienations the need for conservation measures was quite forgotten.⁷²

No less serious, as a departure from forest conservation policies, were the encouragements given by the state to the clearing of private woodlands after mid-eighteenth century. Attention was focused on the need and desirability of larger agricultural production by the spectre of famine, the influence of physiocratic ideas, and the example of English agronomists. In the 1750's the monarchy offered certain tax exemptions to proprietors willing to reclaim or clear their lands for agricultural use. This movement gained momentum quickly, and in 1761 an *arrêt du conseil*, issued under the auspices of the minister, Bertin, allowed the owners of reclaimed land ten years exemption from any increase of the *taille*, twentieth, and other levies. Later legislation, *arrêts* in 1766 and 1767, offered exemptions of even longer duration.⁷³ These enactments were intended, primarily, to bring swamp, waste, and pasture lands under cultivation. If they did not, as one writer held, conflict with the letter of the *Ordonnance of 1669*, they nonetheless did violate its spirit by encouraging proprietors of wooded and partially wooded land to clear the soil.⁷⁴

These decrees created an enthusiastic stir among woodland proprietors tainted by phys-

⁷⁰ Huffel, *Histoire des forêts françaises* (Mimeographed, École Nationale des Eaux et Forêts, Nancy, 1925), 140-141.

⁷¹ D² 16 (Marine), Granville to Castries, October 26, 1786.

⁷² Huffel, *Histoire des forêts françaises*, 137-138.

⁷³ P² 201 (Arch. Nat.), "Mémoire historique sur les défrichements"; Henri Sée, *La Vie économique et les classes sociales en France au XVIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1924), 98-100.

⁷⁴ Rougier de la Bergerie, *Les Forêts de France* (Paris, n. d.), 47.

iocratic ideas, embittered by dealings with local wood merchants or naval timber buyers, or simply irked by the meddling of the state in matters forestrial. Many proprietors welcomed an opportunity to dispose of their stands of trees in order to enjoy the larger immediate profits of agricultural enterprise which the proffered tax exemptions largely enhanced. The existence of such attitudes was made apparent during the Seven Years' War when the prohibition against the cutting of trees marked as naval reserve was temporarily relaxed, and heavy extraordinary cuts resulted.⁷⁵ If wide fluctuations in the price of grains discouraged the timid forest owner, the generally upward trend of agricultural prices was reassuring. The *subdélégué* of Sancoins had reason to remark, in 1783, that "the continual dearness of grains has excited cultivators to clear a great deal of forest."⁷⁶ The forest proprietor's "hope and cupidity" were aroused by rises in the price of grains and feed; "exemption from taxation," it was said, "sustains his courage and enterprise."⁷⁷ The clearing of the land "became a veritable mode."⁷⁸

One eighteenth century memoirist asserted unreservedly that these encouragements by the state were the "first cause for the destruction of forests."⁷⁹ Actually, in many provinces there were almost insuperable legal barriers to clearings; feudal obstacles were reinforced by the opposition of *états*, *parlements*, and intendants alike.⁸⁰ Forest law forbade the cutting of certain reserves of trees, including any marked as naval reserve unless they were cut by the navy's representatives. Yet considerable tracts of woodland were converted to the plow.⁸¹ And the indirect effects of this clearing-reclaiming movement

⁷⁵ D² 15 (Marine), "Mémoire du procureur" (Mariage), October 20, 1778; D² 3 (Marine) fols. 183-186; Mazoyer, "Exploitation forestière," 341.

⁷⁶ Gille, *Les Origines . . . industrie métallurgique*, 74.

⁷⁷ D² 15 (Marine) fol. 111; D² 3 (Marine) fols. 183-186.

⁷⁸ Bergerie, *Les Forêts de France*, 47.

⁷⁹ D² 15 (Marine) fol. 111.

⁸⁰ In Languedoc, Rousillon, and Flanders, for example. Leon Dutil, *L'État économique du Languedoc, 1750-1789* (Paris, 1911), 102-103; Sée, *La Vie économique*, 100 ff. Debien found little or no woodland clearing in Upper Poitou. Gabriel Debien, *En Haut Poitou: Défricheurs au travail, XV^e-XVIII^e siècles* (Paris, 1952), 85.

⁸¹ D² 3 (Marine) fols. 183, 185-186; D² 15 (Mar-

were probably as widespread and as serious in the long run as actual cuts of trees. Wasteland was habitually used by local inhabitants for pasturing domestic animals, and by the poorer classes as a source of fuel. When such wastelands were largely diminished, as was the case in some localities, the demands on the remaining woodlands dangerously increased. It was not unusual for forests to be seriously damaged by livestock in quest of food and country folk in search of fuel.

The clearing movement, like the alienation of royal domains, attests that in the last decades of the old regime the desire for increased agricultural production and the quest for larger royal revenue had higher priority as objectives of policy than did forest conservation.¹ Certainly the dominant preoccupation of the ministers in those years was the desperate and deepening financial crisis which placed them under great pressure to compromise long-term forest conservation measures. Such expedients could be more easily excused at the end of the old regime than ever before. The spectre of forest depletion, which had loomed very large as a threat to self-sufficiency in the minds of mercantilists, assumed less threatening proportions in eighteenth century physiocratic thought, of which some of the finance ministers liberally partook, and had still less importance in the minds of men counseling free trade. By the 1780's imported forest products were already doing yeoman service as substitutes for the products of the realm.² Coal was then supplanting

wood as an industrial fuel on a considerable scale in France.³ These developments helped the finance ministers to rationalize their substitution of forest exploitation for forest conservation. But as excuses they lacked persuasiveness with eighteenth century critics of forest administration, one of whom was moved to observe near the end of the old regime that "this part of the economic administration of the state is strangely neglected."⁴

It was bitter irony that the state should be accused of neglect after more than a century of legislation in behalf of conservation. Yet there can be no doubt that the legislation, though profuse, was undermined in practice by defective theory and by administrative abuse and negligence. Many of the institutional maladies that enfeebled the French monarchy as a whole—lassitude of executive controls, the incompetence of venal officials, and extremes of financial confusion and pressure—concurrent to weaken the effectiveness of forest legislation in a period when the demands of forest users largely increased. Rural inhabitants, industry, cities and towns, and the navy, composed classes of forest users whose role in the preservation of forest resources, where this existed at all, was distinctly secondary to their interest in forest exploitation. Each of these users, equipped with the blinders of self-interest, collided with the interests of each of the others; each sought to turn the intervention of the state to serve its narrow aims. Collectively they had no policy. Government in France, ostensibly manager-protector of forests, was unable to control their inroads on the forests, and long before the end of the old regime had itself joined the ranks of those intent on forest exploitation.

ine) "Mémoire" (1778); Mazoyer, "Exploitation forestière," 341; G. Geneau de Sainte-Gertrude, *La Législation forestière sous l'ancien régime* (Paris, n.d.), 172.

¹ Henri Séé remarks that post-1750 the state was "preoccupied with the development of industry"; of course industrialization entrained forest depletion. "Les Forêts et la question du déboisement," 2.

² D^r 16 (Marine) "Relevé des bois de construction . . . importés dans le royaume" (1782).

³ Coal production increased at least tenfold 1710-1789, standing at about 700,000 tons a year in the 1780's. John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress* (Cambridge, 1950), 282-283.

⁴ G. 122 (Marine) letter to the minister, unsigned, dated December 1762.

GEORGE W. JULIAN: ABOLITIONIST LAND REFORMER

PATRICK W. RIDDLEBERGER

University of Maryland

Students of land policies of the United States have established for George W. Julian of Indiana a well deserved reputation as a land reformer during the latter half of the nineteenth century. By examining his record in Congress, especially as chairman of the House Committee on Public Lands, they have found him to be an intrepid champion of the actual settler and an enemy of the land speculator and monopolist.¹ Indeed, his role in land matters is a significant factor in making him worthy of historical and biographical treatment. Yet only during two relatively short and widely separated periods of his life was Julian primarily interested in land matters. Usually he viewed them as ancillary to other aims and became involved in them as a means of furthering these aims. Hence his career affords an interesting example of the place of land reform in the schemes of a nineteenth century reformer and politician who was successively an abolitionist and leader in the Free Soil party, a Radical Republican, a Liberal Republican, and finally a Cleveland Democrat. These varied party connections suggest that Julian's zeal for reform was tempered with political ambition, but other characteristics ought not to be overlooked in seeking an understanding of his interest in land matters: his acceptance of the idea of progress, his belief in a Jeffersonian agrarian ideal that persisted into the post Civil War era, and his tendency—perhaps even an inner compulsion—to be nearly always involved in some sort of contest.

It was as a member of the famous Thirty-First Congress, which finally adopted the Compromise of 1850, that Julian first indicated an interest in land reform. When as a young man of thirty-two Julian was elected

¹ Paul W. Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South, 1866-1888," *Journal of Southern History*, 6: 305-307, 311 (August, 1940); "The Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land System," *American Historical Review*, 41: 677 (July, 1936); Roy M. Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage* (New York, 1950), 210-211, 215, 276; Henry Nash Smith, *Virgin Land* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950), 195.

to this Congress as a Free Soiler from Indiana's Fifth District, he had already been in politics for five years. The most important development of these years was his departure from the Whig party, into which he had been born and reared, and his entrance into the Free Soil party. Disagreement with his Whig associates in the Indiana legislature over the debt question was one reason for his leaving the Whig party,² but more important was his involvement in the antislavery movement after being deeply impressed with the writings of William Ellery Channing.³ As a Free Soiler, he could combine politics with abolitionism, a choice that no other party afforded him; later this same dualism was the basis of his entrance into the Republican party.

As a member of the Thirty-First Congress, Julian made only two significant speeches. The first was an outright attack on the institution of slavery;⁴ the second came during the debate on Andrew Johnson's Homestead Bill, and it appeared to place him in the ranks of the land reformers. But in this speech Julian went further than mere advocacy of the Homestead Bill. Voicing good Puritan doctrine, he spoke of man's right, or even duty, to cultivate the soil, and in the best Lockian tradition he spoke of the prohibition under natural law of monopoly of the soil. His acceptance of Jeffersonianism was unmistakable: "It may be taken as a general truth," he said, "that the nation will be powerful,

² Logan Esarey, *History of Indiana* (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1915-18), 1: 352-385; George W. Julian, *Political Recollections, 1840-1872* (Chicago, 1884), 37; Richmond [Indiana] *Palladium*, February 18, 1846; March 17, 24, August 17, 1847; Grace Julian Clarke, *George W. Julian* (Indianapolis, 1923), 67-68.

³ George W. Julian, "A Search After Truth," *Unitarian Review*, 29: 48-57 (January, 1888), reprinted in *Indiana Magazine of History*, 32: 250-258 (September, 1936); "Autobiography," quoted in Clarke, *Julian*, 71-78.

⁴ Julian, *Political Recollections*, 88-89; *Congressional Globe*, 31 Cong., 1 sess. (1849-50), 988, appendix, 573-579.

prosperous, and happy in proportion to the number of independent cultivators of its soil." Finally, he went into a denunciation of slavery, comparing Virginia, dying under the curse of the "peculiar institution," to her neighbor Ohio, where the people enjoyed great abundance.⁶ Henry Nash Smith in his book *Virgin Land*, emphasizes this aspect of the speech as reflecting Julian's acceptance of the myth of the West as an agrarian utopia.⁷ But considering Julian's captivation by the antislavery movement at the time, the plea of the Free Soiler looking ahead to the ultimate extinction of slavery seems equally significant.

From 1851 to 1861, Julian held no political office. In 1852, he was the vice-presidential candidate of the Free Democrats, and during the remainder of the decade he concentrated on the formation and organization of the Republican party. As leader of the radical wing of the Hoosier People's party, Julian's overwhelming purpose was to influence its development into an effective anti-slavery organization. The free soil Philadelphia platform, which contained no homestead plank, became his political credo.⁸ It is doubtful that Julian made a single speech on the specific question of land policy during this decade. When not engaged in political activities, he was apt to be using his legal knowledge in defense of fugitive slaves who had been apprehended in Indiana.⁹

Thus it was as a Radical Republican that Julian returned to Congress in 1861. He rendered enthusiastic service on the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Such interest as he displayed in land matters seems to have been clearly subordinate to his Radical aims. In his best known speech of the Thirty-Seventh Congress, Julian succinctly stated the Radical concept of the war when he said, "This is a slaveholders' rebellion. The rebellion, in fact, is 'slavery in arms'" Then he concluded with some remarks foreshadowing at least part of his future land policy:

⁶ *Ibid.*, 31 Cong., 2 sess. (1850-51), appendix, 135-138.

⁷ Smith, *Virgin Land*, 171-172.

⁸ *Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions* (Minneapolis, 1893), 43.

⁹ Charles H. Money, "The Fugitive Slave Law in Indiana," *Indiana Magazine of History*, 17: 257-258, 275 (September, 1921); *Indianapolis Journal*, November 20-December 10, 1857.

While paying a fair assessment for the slaves of loyal owners, [the government] should digest an equitable homestead policy, parcelling out the plantations of rebels in small farms for the enjoyment of the freed-men, who have earned their right to the soil by generations of oppression, instead of selling it in large tracts to speculators, and thus laying the foundation for a system of land monopoly in the South scarcely less to be deplored than slavery itself. It should seize all property belonging to traitors, and use it in defraying the expense of the war.¹⁰

This speech, demonstrating Julian's continuing attachment to the antislavery movement and his concept of the war as a struggle for the destruction of the social and economic system of the South, was his closest approach to land reform during the first two years of the war.

It was Julian's appointment, late in 1863, to the chairmanship of the House Committee on Public Lands that really launched him on his career as a formulator of land policy. From that time on, until he left Congress in 1871, he carried on a relentless battle, first against landed aristocracy of the South and then against land monopoly and speculation of all kinds.

His first blow at the Slaveocracy came early in 1864 when he introduced a bill for the settlement of soldiers on homesteads to be carved out of rebel lands. Before presenting the provisions of the bill, he made some straightforward remarks concerning land policy generally. The homestead law, he warned, was threatened from several directions: there were those who would pay the government debt by selling the public lands instead of granting them to settlers; then there were the grants to schools and colleges that Julian consistently opposed. But the greatest threat, he argued, came from the policy of granting enormous tracts to railroads. And abetting this "backward movement" Julian saw speculators "hovering over the public domain, picking and culling large tracts of the best lands, and thus cheating the government out of their [sic] productive wealth, and the poorman out of the home which else might have been his" Nowhere is Julian's extreme reliance on the homestead principle clearer than in his recommendations for paying the public debt.

¹⁰ George W. Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1872), 192-211; *Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 3 sess. (1863), 1069.

The only way of doing it, he said, was "to give homes to the millions who need them, and . . . to coin their labor into national wealth by marrying it to the virgin soil which woos the cultivator."

Turning again to confiscation of southern lands, Julian could find no legal or constitutional obstacles to such a policy; nor would trials for treason be necessary for the law of nations carried a plenitude of power over conquered provinces. President Lincoln's policy of refusing to allow Congress "to touch the fee of rebels in arms against the nation," which Julian regarded as the President's greatest mistake, must be overthrown. The government had finally learned, Julian said, to "strike at slavery as the wicked cause of the war, and to arm the negroes in the national defense." Now it must take the next logical step—the confiscation of rebel lands. For nothing could "atone for the woes and sorrows of this war but the thorough reorganization of society in the revolted states." Slavery must be "cut up . . . root and branch, and these teeming regions . . . studded over by small farms tilled by free men."³⁰

Julian's bill, which passed the House but was defeated in the Senate, called for the establishment of 80-acre and 40-acre homesteads on the confiscated lands of those who had aided the rebellion. Persons who had served in the Union armed forces or aided the war effort were eligible to settle on the land. A continuous residence of five years was required to consummate the title to one of these homesteads.³¹

Thus ended the first phase of Julian's continuing effort to regenerate the South through land policy. It is apparent that this bill, introduced a year before Appomattox, was envisioned as both a war and a reconstruction measure. Events of the Reconstruction era were to show that it was only a beginning. In 1866 Julian became one of the leaders in the passage of the Southern Homestead Act, designed to open 46,000,000 acres of public land in five southern states for the creation of 80-acre homesteads. In order to preserve these lands for the freedmen, Julian proposed an amendment to the bill to prohibit settlement by all persons who had "borne arms

against the United States or given aid and comfort to its enemies."³² He was adamant in rejecting suggestions of fellow congressmen that the amendment be modified so as to admit to these lands Southerners who had been pardoned. Perhaps Julian's opposition to such a revision stemmed from his fear of a resurgent planter aristocracy in the South whose cause he would not aid even to the extent of 80 acres of public land. But what about the southern poor white who was also excluded by Julian's amendment? The exclusion of this class might suggest that Julian was not so much interested in remodeling the South into a land of small independent farmers as he was in punishing southern rebels. And what of his attitude toward the Negro? His interest in the welfare of the freedmen followed logically his part in the long anti-slavery crusade. Julian not only sought the freedman's economic betterment by granting him land, but he also favored immediate Negro suffrage in the South. In investigating Julian's attitude toward the Negro generally, it should be pointed out that he insisted on the vote for the freedman but he refused to ask the same for the Negro of his native Indiana. Nor did Julian's concern even for the freedman survive his congressional career. One searches virtually in vain for evidence, after 1871, of his continuing regard for the welfare of the Negro, North or South.³³

³⁰ *Congressional Globe*, 39 Cong., 1 sess. (1865-66), 715-718, 748; 39 Cong., 2 sess. (1866-67), 1660-1661; Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South," 308-312; Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage*, 212-213; Clarke, *Julian*, 299.

³¹ In 1876, Julian was one of a group appointed by Abram S. Hewitt, Democratic National Chairman, to observe the activities of the Louisiana Returning Board in New Orleans. During the several weeks that he was there, he had ample opportunity to observe the Negro and conditions in that part of the South; yet in the innumerable letters from Julian to his wife during this period, there were only two references to the Negro. One mentioned the complete incapacity of the two Negro members of the Returning Board, while the other described a meeting with two other Negroes where Julian's chief concern seems to have been that they still regarded him as their champion. Julian, who less than a decade earlier had raged at Lincoln's "sickly magnanimity" and "weak humanitarianism" in his policy toward the South and who had frequently complained that Jeff Davis and Robert E. Lee had cheated the gallows, now found that he was charmed with southern social life and, indeed, in love with that region. Julian to Laura Julian, November 16, 27, 1876, Julian Papers, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis.

³² *Ibid.*, 38 Cong., 1 sess. (1863-64), 668, 874, 1185-1190; Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions*, 214-218, 223-224; Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage*, 214.

³³ Julian, *Political Recollections*, 242-243.

Before leaving Congress, however, Julian made one further effort to apply the homestead principle to the South. He again struck at the policy of granting lands to railroads. In 1856 Congress had granted 5,000,000 acres of public land to five southern states to aid in the construction of railroads. In the summer of 1867, Julian began an abortive campaign in Congress to have these lands returned to the federal government and opened for settlement under the homestead act. Northern investors in southern railroads had their men in Congress to fight Julian's bill. The most persistent of these was John Chandler of New York, who argued that the measure endangered the vested property rights of northern stockholders. James G. Blaine was also opposed to the measure. Eventually, Julian was forced to admit that northern capitalists of unquestioned loyalty controlled the Alabama and Tennessee and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad companies. Even so, he was opposed to exempting these roads from the provisions of the bill. Chandler refused to be a party to punishing loyal corporations for the disloyalty of individuals in them. Blaine wanted these railroads sustained to help rebuild the South; he advocated postponement of a vote until the expected appearance in Congress of loyal representatives from the southern states. In the face of this pressure, Julian continued to insist upon adoption. A map in front of him, he said, showed that the area contained 400,000 acres of valuable mineral lands; "the renewal of this grant in its present form might establish an immense monopoly in the hands of the corporations."¹⁴

Julian's fight against land monopoly was not confined to the South. He also fought the policy of rewarding soldiers with land bounties, which he had found to be more an instrument of speculation than an aid to the soldier. For similar reasons, he opposed grants to eleemosynary institutions and grants to railroads in every region. His land policy, offered through a series of proposed legis-

¹⁴ New York Tribune, July 6, December 10, 1867; Gates, "Federal Land Policy in the South," 308; Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage*, 212-213; Congressional Globe, 40 Cong., 1 sess. (1867), 615-617; 40 Cong., 2 sess. (1867-68), 95, 310-312, 694-697, 806-814, 833-844, 985; New York Times, January 31, February 1, 6, 1868; Richmond Palladium, February 13, 1868.

lative measures, embraced the central idea that in the future public lands should be disposed of exclusively to actual settlers under the pre-emption and homestead laws. In place of proposed land bounties to veterans, Julian suggested a cash bounty of approximately \$8.30 for each month of military service. Later the House Military Committee reported a bill with this provision that passed the House several times but was rejected by the Senate.¹⁵

From the West came grateful approval of Julian's program. Letters flowed into the office of the Indiana *True Republican*, Julian's political organ, urging him to continue the fight against land monopoly. The Chicago Tribune zealously defended a bill that Julian had introduced that would have required railroads to sell lands granted to them by the federal government to settlers at a maximum price of \$2.50 per acre. The Tribune's only complaint was that the bill did not go far enough, that it ought to have provided for government regulation of freight and passenger rates on all railroads with land grants.¹⁶ Julian had little sympathy with or understanding of such ideas. His ardent advocacy of governmental control of monopoly was not tainted with any suggestion that the government embark on a policy of extensive business regulation or planning. His appeals for adoption of his land measures continued to be couched in the language of the Jeffersonian ideal and reflected the habit of Julian and others to turn back to the bucolic environment and training of their youth for their solutions to problems of the post Civil War years. Citing such authorities as John Stuart Mill, Vattel, and Sismondi, Julian spoke of the cultivation of the soil as the natural employment of man and the basis of the independent citizenry of small farmers that he believed indispensable to "comfort, security, confidence in the future . . . happiness, and virtue."¹⁷

¹⁵ Congressional Globe, 40 Cong., 3 sess. (1868-69), 958-959; Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions*, 365-398; Gates, "Homestead Law in an Incongruous Land System," 677-678; Richmond True Republican, April 23, 1868; New York Tribune, December 5, 1866; Julian, *Political Recollections*, 277-280; Robbins, *Our Landed Heritage*, 215-216; Clarke, Julian, 298-299.

¹⁶ Richmond True Republican, May 7, 1868.

¹⁷ Julian, *Speeches on Political Questions*, 367-371.

Thus during his last two or three years in Congress, Julian's land policy crusade was undergoing a change: now he placed much greater emphasis on the actual settler in all regions and less on remodeling the South. His personal correspondence, as well as his public speeches, leave little doubt that he fancied himself as the champion, often fighting alone, of the glorified pioneer. This view of himself was to some extent rational and understandable, but Julian's growing tendency was to make a fetish of the actual settler. His part in the Yosemite Valley case is a good example. In 1864, the federal government had granted the valley to California, to be preserved as a public park. Soon after the grant was made, James M. Hutchings and J. C. Lamon each claimed a quarter-section of land under the pre-emption laws. Appealing to the California legislature, they each received 160 acres, subject to the ratification of Congress. The case aroused great interest. In Congress, Julian took the lead in an unsuccessful effort to sustain the claims of the settlers. Outside of Congress, Horace Greeley publicized the case by carrying on a public debate with Julian in the New York *Tribune*. Julian argued that if the settlers were not sustained, the very idea of pre-emption would be undermined. Greeley answered that to uphold the Californians' claims might establish a dangerous precedent under which squatters could prevent the application of the government's right of eminent domain. The most damaging evidence against Julian's side came from Josiah Dwight Whitney—geologist, metallurgist, commissioner of the Yosemite Park, and Harvard professor. Whitney claimed that Hutchings and Lamon had settled in the valley only a few weeks before Congress had made its grant to California, a clear hint that their interests were speculative. Certainly these men were not among Julian's "great advancing column of settlers who explore and subdue our distant borders, encountering savages and wild beasts in laying the foundations of new commonwealths" Probably neither of the two men was dependent on the land for a living. Certainly Hutchings, a California publisher and artist, was not. In 1872, Julian no longer in Congress, argued the case for the claimants when it came before the Supreme Court. The substance of his argument was that the settlers had a valid claim to the land through the act

of settling on it, even though the title had not been cleared. The Court's decision against the claimants rested on two related concepts: (1) that "mere settlement" on the land does not automatically entitle the settler to a vested interest in it or destroy the power of Congress to grant it to another party, in this case the state of California, and (2) that the private interests of individuals cannot contravene the public interest.¹³

From 1871 to 1876, Julian was making the transition, via the Liberal Republican movement, to the Democratic party. His wrath against land monopolists abated during this period, and the advocates of cheap money, all of whom he indiscriminately tagged with the opprobrious term "inflationist," came under his caustic attacks. Bitterly disappointed in Tilden's defeat, in whose administration he had hoped to hold office, the repeal of the Southern Homestead Act in 1876 did not disturb him. True, he wrote to the New York *Tribune* denouncing its repeal, but his personal correspondence and public speeches register no regrets.

During the decade following 1876, Julian wrote a number of articles that appeared in the *North American Review*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, and the *International Review*. Taken together, these articles constitute an attack on the Republican party, and his article on "Railway Influence in the Land Office," which appeared in the *North American Review* in 1883, must be placed in this context. In trying to show that the Land Office had become the servant of the railroads, Julian pointed to several practices used there. Many illegal indemnities had been made to the railroads for lands to which they were not entitled. After 1880, the Secretary of the Interior gave a new interpretation to a ruling that had been in effect since 1859. In 1859, Attorney General Black had ruled that the railroads might receive, merely for their information, a certified list of lands due to come into their hands, but not yet earned. But under the new

¹³ House Report No. 2, 41 Cong., 2 sess. (1869-70), New York *Tribune*, June 24, July 2, 10, 17, 21, 24, 30, 1868; March 23, 1869; *Congressional Globe*, 40 Cong., 2 sess. (1867-68), 2585, 2816-2817; 41 Cong., 1 sess. (1869), 194; 41 Cong., 2 sess. (1869-70), 2726, 5129-5132; George W. Julian, "Our Land Policy," *Atlantic Monthly*, 43: 334-335 (March 1879); Carl P. Russell, *One Hundred Years in Yosemite* (Berkeley, California, 1947), 50-57; *Wallace Reports*, 15: 77-94.

interpretation, these certified lists became valid and conclusive and had the force of patents. In this way, 10,000,000 acres of illegal indemnity lands had been awarded to the railroads. Grants had been made to many railroads and these lands reserved from settlement without the railroad's having earned them. In some cases, only part of the railroad had been built (North Louisiana and Texas Railroad); in others, no railroad had been built (Pensacola and Georgia Railroad). The overworked Commissioner of the General Land Office was forced to sign decisions that he had never examined. Clerks with no legal training and with little acquaintance with rules of evidence, frequently had the power to decide intricate cases. Worst of all, Julian argued, the settler was placed in a difficult position. Unable to employ competent counsel, he had to contend with the best legal talent money could buy on behalf of the railroads. There were no formal hearings in cases between railroads and settlers, and railroad lawyers "have access to the chiefs of divisions, and their constructions of law are generally impressed upon the minds of clerks having the cases in charge, notwithstanding the regulations of the department prohibiting conferences between attorneys and clerks, except upon permission."²⁸

Perhaps it was this demonstrated acquaintance with land matters, as well as his continued loyalty to the Democratic party, that led to President Cleveland's decision to appoint Julian to some office concerned with land policy. Julian wanted to be Commissioner of the General Land Office but when this appointment and the governorship of New Mexico slipped from his grasp, he eagerly accepted the appointment as Surveyor General of that territory.²⁹ Thus in the latter years of his life Julian again had an opportunity to share in the shaping of land policy.

When Julian arrived in New Mexico, he found that 9,000,000 acres of land that he believed ought to have been preserved as a part of the public domain had passed into

the hands of speculators. He attributed this situation to the ineptness of Congress in whose hands rested the final disposition of claims under Mexican and Spanish grants; but even more culpable, he believed, were his predecessors in the Surveyor General's office. Immediately Julian began an examination of claims approved by his predecessors, and of the thirty-five examined before the end of his term, he rejected thirty-three. As an enemy of the land monopolist operating under Spanish or Mexican claims, Julian had the unwavering support of William Sparks, Commissioner of the General Land Office during most of Cleveland's first administration. In 1887 Julian wrote another article for the *North American Review* accusing Stephen W. Dorsey, among others, of stealing land in New Mexico under a forged grant. When the nature of the grant was discovered, Julian claimed, Dorsey had turned to the homestead and pre-emption laws for protection and had used his influence with the General Land Office to have reserved lands illegally opened for settlement. Julian's facts had been materially substantiated by Sparks, who wrote to Julian that he had searched the records of the Land Office but had "fail[ed] to find any instructions giving the Surveyor General . . . authority to extend the lines of the public land surveys over the area embraced in the original instructions for the survey of the *Uña de Gato* [Dorsey] Grant." Yet it appeared that the Surveyor General had proceeded in 1879, 1880, and 1881, to let contracts that had not been approved and accepted by the Land Office.³⁰

Another case, which occurred toward the end of Julian's term as Surveyor General, involved the Mora grant. This case brought Julian into sharp conflict with S. M. Stockslager, Sparks' successor in the Commissioner's office. The disagreement was over the northern boundary of the grant, which Stockslager insisted was Ocate Creek, and he repeatedly ordered Julian to change the plat so as to show the stream as the boundary. This Julian refused to do, even after the Commissioner cited as legal precedent the

²⁸ George W. Julian, "Railway Influence in the Land Office," *North American Review*, 36: 240-255 (March, 1883).

²⁹ Julian to Grover Cleveland, May 12, 19, 27, 1885, Grover Cleveland Collection, Library of Congress; George W. Julian, "Land Stealing in New Mexico," *North American Review*, 145: 17-31 (July, 1887).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 27-29; Stephen W. Dorsey, "Land Stealing in New Mexico, a Rejoinder," *North American Review*, 145: 396-409 (October, 1887); Letter Book, Surveyor General, New Mexico, Vol. 4, Land Office Records, National Archives.

case of *New Orleans v. U. S.*, purporting to show that under common law a stream once established as a boundary remained so in spite of a future change in the stream's course. Julian replied that he could not comply with the Commissioner's order for to do so would completely reverse past decisions and policy. Instead, he was placing the whole matter again before the Commissioner "in the hope that general instructions may be issued by you for the guidance of this office in this and future cases." In reply to Stockslager's legal argument, Julian pointed out that the decision in *New Orleans v. U. S.* was not applicable to the Mora grant for it had involved a corporation, the city of New Orleans, holding title to land "formed by the alluvial deposits on a navigable stream." The corporation owned the land to which the alluvium clung. This was an accretion, and the general principle of the common law on that subject was perfectly applicable to it. But the Mora case, Julian argued, involved a tract of land 200 or 300 acres in extent not created or moved by the action of the water. Then he cited a decision by Justice Miller where it was stated that lands claimed under Mexican or Spanish grants "but not found within the limits of the final survey when made . . . are restored to the public domain by the survey." The principle of riparian ownership, said Julian (citing Gould on Waters), did not always extend to the stream. Certainly it could not be applied in New Mexico where the streams could not be depended on to be in the same location twice within twenty-four hours. What Julian wanted, he told the Commissioner, was a policy "that would give no countenance to the theory that the boundaries of a patented grant are floating in the air like clouds, instead of being fixed and determined lines on the earth's surface."²²

It is apparent that Julian was well fitted by temperament and training to deal with the Spanish and Mexican land grant cases, but another part of the job that he regarded as equally important was to bring about the confirmation of the claims of small settlers under the pre-emption laws. Here Julian came into conflict with Commissioner Sparks. One of Julian's first acts after taking office was to approve and to forward to the Com-

sioner the applications of a number of settlers to have the lands they occupied surveyed. Sparks's rejection of many of these applications emanated from a desire for land reform that was certainly equal to Julian's in its intensity. But Sparks, while not forgetting the small settler, had become concerned with the need to conserve the country's natural resources. His policy was to approve no applications for surveys in mountain or timber areas. He returned many applications that Julian had approved, frequently requesting more information as to the nature of the land. This policy brought delays that annoyed Julian. Sometimes he raged at Sparks that he could not get more information without making personal examinations in the field for which Congress had provided no money. He accused Sparks of not being forceful enough with Congress in setting forth the need of further appropriations. Sparks received this criticism, for the most part, in good grace. His replies were firm but controlled and often expressed appreciation of the difficulties under which Julian worked.²³

Sparks belonged to a school of land reformers who were maintaining ever more vigorously that the pre-emption laws no longer served the settler but abetted speculators, monopolists, and cattle companies. On the same ground, he called for repeal of the commutation clause of the homestead law. His strongest plea was for the preservation of the forests, whose depletion reduced the cultivable area of the soil, increased the danger of floods, and made rivers less navigable. He warned that calamity would follow the widespread destruction of the forests and that they could be renewed only at enormous cost.²⁴ Sparks demonstrated a greater awareness of many of the realities of his era than Julian, who successfully convinced himself, and persisted in the belief, that the establishment of the settler on 160 acres of land would solve the nation's post Civil War problems. Yet Julian's thinking about the actual settler, whose champion he longed to be, involved

²² Julian to Sparks, October 17, 1885; February 6, 1886; Sparks to Julian, December 25, 1885; February 12, December 22, 1886, *ibid.*

²³ *Report of the Commissioner of the General Land Office* (49 Cong., 1 sess., House Executive Document no. 1, vol. 11, pt. 5, serial 2378, Washington, 1886), 155-587; Harold H. Dunham, "Some Crucial Years of the General Land Office, 1875-1890," *Agricultural History*, 11: 136-139 (April, 1937).

²² Stockslager to Julian, April 26, 1889; Julian to Stockslager, May 3, 1889, *ibid.*

him in some gross inconsistencies. Indeed, he seems to have known little about this actual settler. Greenbackers and Free Silverites were anathema to him, but he never searched very deeply for the causes of the farmer's distress. By protecting a few settlers in New Mexico or by taking the part of a Hutchings in the Yosemite Valley, Julian really believed that he was coming to grips with the agrarian problem. For the Populists and their demands for more protection by the national government, he had nothing but contempt.

Thus, in his approach to agrarian and land problems in the post Civil War decades, Julian was demonstrating one of the perplexing

dilemmas of the era—the tendency to turn back to the values and credos of the antebellum period for solutions to problems intricately related to the industrial revolution in America. This basic factor in part explains Julian's role as a land reformer, but determinants stemming from the man's personality, as reflected in his adolescent reaction to Commissioner Sparks, who was basically in sympathy with his ideas, must also be considered. Time and time again Julian seems to have narrowly missed rising to the level of statesmanship because of his compulsion for controversy. His consciousness of himself as a crusader frequently blinded him to the overall significance of the problem.

THE SOUTHERN AGRICULTURAL PRESS AND SOME SIGNIFICANT RURAL PROBLEMS, 1900-1940

GEORGE C. OSBORN

University of Florida

Southern agricultural periodicals were journals designed primarily to offer constructive advice to practical farmers on how to grow bigger and better crops and on how to make more money from planting operations. Although there were many of these farm journals during the first forty years of the twentieth century, only five were used extensively in the preparation of this article. These five—the *Southern Agriculturist*, the *Southern Cultivator*, the *Southern Planter*, the *Progressive Farmer* and the *Southern Ruralist*—were probably the best known and ranked high in circulation among the large group. In 1900 all of this select group of farm periodicals had a combined circulation of less than 100,000 copies. By 1905, they had a subscription list of approximately 100,000. The *Southern Cultivator* had 39,111 subscribers, the *Southern Ruralist*, 36,500, and the *Southern Planter*, 16,000.¹ In 1940 the *Southern Planter* alone listed 309,749 subscribers; the *Southern Agriculturist* informed its readers that it had a circulation of 884,018. The *Progressive Farmer* and the *Southern Rural-*

ist had combined and boasted almost a million subscriptions.² It would be difficult in one article to discuss, with any degree of competency, the full scope of the problems reported in the agricultural press and the numerous suggestions published for their solutions. A wealth of material covering practically every phase of plant and animal production is to be found. From the multiplicity of problems which plagued the rural South, 1900-1940, as revealed by agricultural periodicals, the author has chosen to discuss five significant ones. These are the one-crop system of farming, unproductive soils, tractor power on the farm, rural electrification, and farm tenancy.

One of the greatest hindrances to a sustained agricultural development in the South was the general dependence on a one-crop system of farming. The reason for this type of farming, stated the *Southern Agriculturist* in 1904, was the widely held idea that the production of cotton was usually profitable. This paper deplored the fact that recent rising prices for cotton would probably wipe out the small gains which diversified farming

¹ N. W. Ayers and Son, compilers, *American Newspaper Annual, 1905* (Philadelphia, 1905), 1049-1054.

² J. Percy H. Johnson, ed., *N. W. Ayers and Son's Directory Newspapers and Periodicals, 1940* (Philadelphia, 1940), 1148-1153.

had made during the period of extremely low prices in the 1890's, and urged its readers not to increase their acreages allotted to cotton production.³ The *Southern Ruralist*, in 1910, warned that rising prices for cotton would again result in overplanting and cautioned against it. Moreover, this journal promised to publish information which would enable its readers to double their yield of cotton without increasing the acreage of the preceding year. The plan for increased production per acre included planting prolific and high percentage lint varieties, intensive cultivation, generous use of commercial fertilizers, and adoption of methods to control boll weevil damage.⁴ In order to make its program more attractive, the *Ruralist* offered a prize of one hundred dollars to the reader who produced the highest yield of cotton on a single acre using the methods outlined in the journal.⁵ The depressing effect such an increased cotton crop would have on prices was not discussed. Although the *Ruralist* repeatedly denounced the one-crop system of farming, it offered its readers no economically sound means of escaping from it.⁶

In company with the *Southern Agriculturist* and the *Southern Ruralist* in their attacks upon one-crop farming was the *Progressive Farmer*.⁷ It, too, began to offer prizes to its readers but, unlike the *Southern Ruralist*, the *Progressive Farmer* did not advocate increased yields of cotton per acre. The emphasis was upon "diversification and independence."⁸ Throughout the period under study, this paper continued to attack the generally accepted pattern of Southern farming. The *Progressive Farmer*, in 1940, took a retrospective view of the one-crop system and concluded that much progress had been made toward diversified farming; however, the pre-

³ Thomas J. Key, "Cotton Growing and Diversified Farming," *Southern Agriculturist*, 34: 4 (1904).

⁴ "The Publishers . . .," *Southern Ruralist*, 16: 19 (1910).

⁵ "Editorial Notes," *ibid.*, 16: 20.

⁶ Consult files of this paper in Atlanta, Georgia, for articles concerning this problem. An excellent example is Cully A. Cobb, "Banks and the One-Crop System," *Southern Ruralist*, 30: 1 (1924).

⁷ See Clarence Poe, "Why Cotton Did Not Pay Most Farmers Last Year," *Progressive Farmer*, 28: 6 (1912).

⁸ "Prize Winning Live-at-Home Letters," *Progressive Farmer* (Ala., Tenn., Miss., Ark. edition), 30: 170 (1915).

ponderance of cotton production had not vanished from Southern farms. Southern farmers needed more enlightenment before a system of diversified farming could be fully established south of the Mason and Dixon Line.⁹

Although several editors of the Southern agricultural press made repeated efforts to break the hold which the one-crop system held on this region, none waged as vigorous an attack as did Gustavus W. Dyer, editor of the *Southern Agriculturist*. To Dyer the one-crop system was a pitiable relic of a dead system of agriculture. Any farmer who depended upon one crop for his livelihood was non-progressive and out of harmony with his environment. The person who made good on the farm in the second generation of the twentieth century must harvest and market farm produce repeatedly during the year. Under earlier conditions, when the farmer was far removed from an effective market, the one-crop type of farming was possibly excusable. The invention of cheap refrigeration and the development of an improved road system brought the farmer much nearer adequate markets and destroyed all justification for any single crop agricultural pattern in the South.¹⁰ Throughout the 1930's this paper continued to urge diversified farming; it even held that farms should be made self-providing.¹¹

The one-crop system of farming was acclaimed by all Southern agricultural papers as the greatest obstacle to general rural prosperity in the South. Without cotton with its early summer blooms and autumnal whiteness, there would be no Southland. With little but cotton produced on the farms, they agreed, there would continue to be a poverty-stricken South.

Another basic problem of southern farming, as seen by the agricultural press, was the millions of acres of generally unproductive soils. As early as 1904 the *Southern Ag-*

⁹ Talt Butler, "For Balanced Prosperity, 1940-1950," *Progressive Farmer* (Ky., Tenn. edition), 55: 66 (1940).

¹⁰ See issues of the *Southern Agriculturist*, Vol. 56 (1927) to Vol. 63 (1934), during the years Gustavus W. Dyer was one of the editors. Especially good is his "The New Industrial Revolution and the Farmer," 59:4 (1930).

¹¹ L. R. Neel, "Diversified Farming Not Always Self-Providing," *Southern Agriculturist*, 67: 3 (1937).

riculturist ably presented this problem. These marginal productive lands, a result of wide-spread erosion and one-crop system, could be improved by scientific farming and by the production of livestock. Under existing southern conditions, however, improvement of poor farming lands seemed an impossibility. James Q. Hunnicutt, editor of the *Southern Cultivator*, also recognized this problem. He believed that, in farming, "a deep soil was the foundation of success." The need for putting into the soil additional plant food had been urgent for years. As the years passed by, the need increased. To make the largest yield per acre and at the same time to increase the fertility of the soil was the greatest problem taxing the ingenuity of Southern farmers.¹³

Several years later the *Progressive Farmer* and the *Southern Planter* began to give space to this significant problem. In 1911 the *Progressive Farmer* reported that the so-called advantages of Southern farming, in reality, did not exist. No advantage of a mild climate and of an abundant rainfall would compensate for the unproductive soil so prevalent throughout much of this region. The miserable crop yields showed that soil-enriching crops had not been planted as they should have been and that the South was neglecting the rebuilding of its soils.¹⁴

About the same time the *Southern Planter*, while admitting that many features of Southern farming needed to be improved, contend- ed that the panacea for the rural people of this area was "broad fields of rich land." In the 1920's two farm journals of secondary importance, the *Arkansas Farmer and Homestead* and the *Florida Farmer*, took up the problem. The Arkansas paper contended poor soil was a major problem in the eastern South, a problem that was accentuated by a scarcity of labor, excessive taxes, and other abnormal conditions created by World War I. Throughout the Southeast farms were being abandoned at an increasing rate. Such a condition did not exist west of the Mississippi River. The *Florida Farmer* admitted that

¹³ Robert Gallagher, "Preservation of Our Soil," *ibid.*, 84:1 (1904); Thomas J. Key, "The Tenant and Soil Improvement," *ibid.*, 41:4 (1911); James B. Hunnicutt, "A Deep Soil the Foundation of Success," *Southern Cultivator*, 61:1 (1908); George F. Hunnicutt, "Farm Problems in the South," *ibid.*, 68:2 (1910).

¹⁴ Clarence Poe, "The South's Greatest Agricultural Asset," *Progressive Farmer*, 16:1005 (1911).

soil exhaustion, caused by erosion, had been active continuously for millions of years. Erosion processes had been accelerated by cutting the forest and by unscientifically cultivating the soil. All farmers should be concerned about the washing away of the top soil and measures should be taken to prevent further erosion. In the opinion of the *Florida Farmer*, however, several other farm problems were currently of greater importance than soil exhaustion.¹⁵

During the 40-year period under consideration, soil exhaustion was widely discussed by the Southern agricultural journals. The inadequacy of the essential plant food elements in the soil was generally recognized. At least two causes of soil exhaustion were usually admitted—soil erosion and the planting of soil exhausting crops. Methods to check further soil exhaustion and to restore soil fertility were offered to the readers of the Southern agricultural press. Among the remedial suggestions to check soil erosion was the control of surface water. Don't let muddy surface water leave your farm, admonished the *Progressive Farmer*.¹⁶ Farmers should prevent the washing of top soil. Gullies already in existence should be properly filled. Lessons must be learned from the recurring floods on the lower Mississippi River and its tributaries. A national program of soil conservation should be initiated immediately. Finally, reforestation must be undertaken as an agricultural project. As a method of checking soil erosion, farmers, where possible, should replant barren areas.¹⁷

How could the Southern farmer enrich his land? This question was asked repeatedly by the rural press. Soil robbing, through the planting of soil-depleting crops, must cease, declared the *Southern Cultivator*. Farmers

¹⁵ "What Is the Most Important Problem before Our Rural People?" *Southern Planter*, 74:289 (1918); *Arkansas Farmer and Homestead*, 21:8 (1920); "Another Farm Problem," *Florida Farmer*, 81:6 (1929).

¹⁶ C. L. Newman, "How Do You Control Surface Water?" *Progressive Farmer*, 27:42 (1912); Tait Butler, "We Must Stop Our Land from Washing Away," *ibid.*, 27:637; Clarence Poe, "Don't Let Muddy Water Leave Your Farm," *ibid.*, 81:277 (1916).

¹⁷ E. E. Miller, "The Gullies Must Be Stopped," *Southern Agriculturist*, 55:5 (1925); B. Kirk Rankin, "Lesson of the Floods," *ibid.*, 66:8 (1936); "National Soil Conservation," *Southern Planter*, 97:4 (April, 1936).

should plant soil-enriching crops. The planting of leguminous crops, which though making demands on the soil for plant food yet returned to the soil large amounts of nitrogen, was encouraged. Nitrogen, one of the essential elements in plant life, was frequently lacking in soils of the South. Fertile land meant higher yields and proportionately larger incomes for the farmers. Rich lands created greater economic opportunities and made fewer financial burdens for Southern farmers. Although other basic problems were discussed repeatedly in the Southern agricultural periodicals, the complex and significant issue of poor land apparently was constantly in the minds of the editors.¹⁷

Within a few months of the United States' entrance into World War I, when a severe shortage of rural manpower seemed imminent, the *Progressive Farmer* suddenly displayed a great interest in farm tractors. Editor Tait Butler freely admitted that tractors had many mechanical imperfections and were expensive, but he predicted that as the mechanical deficiencies were removed and as the excessive cost lowered, they would be more generally used by Southern farmers. Thereafter editors frequently recommended tractors as the most modern method of increasing farm power potential. Readers were told that the use of a tractor would solve some of their farm problems. The *Southern Ruralist* even explained that Negro tenants could operate a tractor successfully if the land owner exercised good judgment in the selection of the drivers.¹⁸

In general, the editors felt that Southern agriculture was lagging. Farmers had refused to take invention and science as fully into partnership as businessmen had done. They were paying dearly for this refusal. The cotton planter faced the dual problem

of lowering the cost of production and of increasing the quality of his product. More extensive use of machinery would help enormously. Much improvement, however, must be made by the individual farmer before his vocation was made financially sound and economically secure. Clarence Poe, writing in the *Progressive Farmer*, listed as first among the Southern farmers' problems the need of more horsepower and machinery for efficient production and for adequate marketing. He thought the lack of sufficient farm power was a primary obstacle which must be overcome or surmounted by the Southern farmer to obtain a richer and finer rural culture.¹⁹

James Speed, in the *Southern Agriculturist*, emphasized the same problem but treated it in an entirely different way. In farming, there were three levels of power efficiency, which Speed illustrated adequately with photographs. The most inefficient, according to this writer, was the farmer at work on his little farm behind a mule hitched to a single plow, stirring a little land, upon which to plant crops to sell for a little money. This farmer with his inadequate equipment could never put much enthusiasm into his labor. A little better off was the farmer who was shown with a two-horse team hitched to a heavy plow. But the plow required more power than the horses could furnish. The best solution was shown in a photograph of a farmer riding his tractor which was pulling a gang plow. Mechanical power was required for the toughest kind of plowing. For his increased efforts the farmer would receive a higher net income.²⁰

At the end of the period under study, farm journals were repeatedly urging the utilization of suitable tractor power on Southern farms. The *United States Census Reports* reveal that the promptings of the rural press were not in vain. In 1920, there were on farms in the South Atlantic states 11,229 tractors; in 1940, 63,203. In the East South Central states the figures were as follows: in 1920—5,379 tractors and in 1940—41,959. In the West South Central states there were in the earlier date 19,892 tractors and

¹⁷ Tait Butler, "How the South Can Get Richer Land," *Progressive Farmer*, 42: 10 (1927); Loy E. Rast, "Soil Robbing Must Come to an End," *Southern Cultivator*, 93: 8 (1935); C. A. Mathews, "A New Soil Building Crop for the South," *Southern Agriculturist*, 67: 16 (1937); L. R. Neel, "Rich Lands Mean More Opportunities and Less Burdens for the Farm," *ibid.*, 68: 6 (1938); Cully A. Cobb, "The South's Wasted Land," *Southern Ruralist*, 31: 14 (1924).

¹⁸ Tait Butler, "Farm Tractors for Southern Farmers" and "The Tractor Has Come to Stay," *Progressive Farmer* (Ala., Tenn., Miss., Ark. edition), 31: 249 (1916); Cully A. Cobb, "Negroes and Tractors," *Southern Ruralist*, 31: 12 (1924).

¹⁹ Cobb, "The Significance of This Special Issue of the *Ruralist*," *ibid.*, 33: 3 (1927); Clarence Poe, "The Most Important Farm Problem," *Progressive Farmer* (Va., N.C., S.C. edition), 40: 759 (1925).

²⁰ James Speed, "Power Puts Pep in Farming," *Southern Agriculturist*, 60: 9 (1929).

twenty years later these states had a total of 166,332 tractors. In these three areas, not exactly the traditional South however, there were in 1920 a total of 36,500 tractors as compared with 270,500 at the close of the period; an increase of 234,000 during the twenty-year span. Some social scientists were blaming the increasing use of farm machinery for much unemployment and other country community ills. Surely no thoughtful person would contend seriously that farmers should use ox carts and plows pulled by slow mules to compete with streamlined industry in the twentieth century. However, there were sound economic reasons why tractors and other modern farm machinery were here to stay.²¹

In the late 1920's and thereafter, one finds in the Southern farm journals discussions of rural electrification. The *Southern Ruralist* pointed out the lack of distribution of electricity in the rural South. The rates that utility corporations were charging for electricity were compared with the much lower rates of Canadian electrical companies. In explaining the absence of rural electrification, the *Southern Ruralist* claimed that the South had been victimized by smooth-talking representatives of the power corporations. As unregulated utility corporations, these electrical companies enjoyed a monopoly throughout the South. Farmers were encouraged to inform themselves of the possibilities of securing electricity in rural areas.²² Repeatedly, Editor Cully A. Cobb endeavored to arouse interest in and create enthusiasm for this relatively new but extremely important development.

In 1930 the *Southern Ruralist* was moved from Atlanta to Birmingham and united with the *Progressive Farmer*. From the "Pittsburgh of the South," Cobb, now editor of the *Progressive Farmer*, continued to encourage the development of rural electrification. When the federal government early in the New Deal era began the construction of a series of dams

on the Tennessee River and its tributaries, Cobb was delighted. He wrote at length on the Tennessee Valley Authority, on how greatly such a project was needed, and on the many benefits that Southern farmers would receive from this development. The "socialistic" nature of TVA did not trouble this farm journal. The advantages which Southern agriculture would enjoy provided the note of enthusiasm for Cobb.²³

J. E. Stanford wrote in the *Southern Agriculturist* that electricity was the farmers' new "hired man." In the mid-South, as the various dams were completed by the Tennessee Valley Authority, electric wires stretched for hundreds of miles to distant farms. There was a remarkable increase in the number of farms served by electricity throughout the Southland in the 1930's. In the South Atlantic states, for example, farms reporting electricity in 1930 were 64,178, but by 1940 the total had risen to 253,577. In the East South Central states the increase in farms using electricity in this decade was from 31,952 to 146,202. In the West South Central states, out of the Tennessee Valley Authority area, the development of rural electrification in the 1930's was equally startling. Here the increase was from 40,240 farms to 162,479 or a net increase of 122,239 farms to secure electricity during the decade.²⁴ By 1940, the rural South was being rapidly transformed; many Southern farm families were enjoying some of the modern conveniences of their friends in town. Living in the country was much more pleasant than a generation earlier. Nothing perhaps, contributed as much to the comfort and convenience of rural life as electricity.

From the dawn of the twentieth century, the Southern farm journals recognized tenancy as a major problem. A vast majority of them treated this question primarily from the viewpoint of the landlord. In 1904 the *Progressive Farmer* reported that farmers who provided the best houses for their renters would usually have the best type of tenants to work their land. Within a few months the *Southern Planter* expressed the same sen-

²¹ L. R. Neel, "Tractors with a Southern Accent" and "Falsely Accusing the Tractor," *Southern Agriculturist*, 70:8 (1940); Eugene Butler, "The Tractor Moves Out into the Two Horse Farm," *Progressive Farmer* (Ky., Tenn. edition), 54:8 (1939); U. S. Census Office, 14th Census, 1920, vol. 6, *Agriculture*, pt. 2, *The Southern States*, 50; U. S. Census Office, 16th Census, 1940, vol. 3, *Agriculture*, 513.

²² Cully A. Cobb, "Where Hydro-Electric Power is Cheap," *Southern Ruralist*, 33: 12 (1926).

²³ Cobb, "The Tennessee Valley Project," *Progressive Farmer* (Ky., Tenn. edition), 48:5 (1933).

²⁴ J. E. Stanford, "The Farmers' New 'Hired Man,'" *Southern Agriculturist*, 66:5 (1936); U. S. Census Office, 16th Census, 1940, *Agriculture*, 541.

timent—an attractive home was necessary to securing a good tenant."

After traveling over parts of the rural South by train and viewing thousands of acres of land, George F. Hunnicutt, of the *Southern Cultivator*, wrote of the many perplexities of the labor problem of Southern farmers. He spoke of the acres poorly tilled by inefficient tenants, of the need for greater production, of the tenant's financial obligations for rent, commercial fertilizer, and rations, clothing, and fuel for himself and his family. The South was in dire need of an improved system of labor. There should not be injustices to agricultural labor, nor any coercive measures adopted against tenants, but a better established relationship between landowners and workers. Then the soil would be better cultivated and larger crops could be harvested for the improved welfare of both the farmer and the tenant. Plans for creating better relations between the landowners and the laborers were suggested. First, a written contract with wage hands should contain a provision for the withholding of a part of the wages until a month's work had been done by the employee. Second, when farmers contracted with tenants to work on crop shares, provision should be made for the preservation of the land. Third, by intelligent supervision landlords should strive to make their tenants more efficient. Fourth, farmers should endeavor to produce more crops that required less labor.²⁶ Obviously, such a program would be more advantageous to the landowner than to the tenant.

Further evidence of the *Southern Cultivator's* pro-landlord bias was revealed in the publication of a series of articles on "Labor Problems on Southern Farms." In a very real way, declared the *Southern Cultivator*, the South had an objectionable class of tenants on its farms. This was especially true in sections where the Negro was predominant. The colored tenant, however, was not wholly to blame for his shiftlessness. The Negro tenant was usually given too much credit. As a result, a crop shortage meant nothing more to the tenant than a larger

²⁶ Clarence Poe, "Better Houses for Farm Tenants," *Progressive Farmer*, 18:11 (1904); J. F. Jackson, "Rented Farms," *Southern Planter*, 66:622 (1905).

²⁷ George F. Hunnicutt, "The Labor Question," *Southern Cultivator*, 65:2 (1907).

credit account against him to be carried over to the next year. The real loss was borne by the landowner, not by the tenant. It would be better for the landlord to permit his land to grow up in field pines. Although the paper pulp industry had not yet moved into the South, the *Cultivator* contended that within 10 years' time the timber would be worth more in cordwood than the net profits from such renters for the same length of time.

In order to dramatize more vividly the actual conditions under which many Negro tenants negotiated with Southern landowners an extended conversation between a colored worker and the landlord was published in this farm paper:

"Well, Boss, I'se come over to see 'bout renting er farm for next year," said the prospective Negro tenant.

"All right, John, how much force have you?" inquired the farmer.

"Nough to run two horses."

"How do you want to work, on halves or standing rent?"

"Wants to rent, sah."

"Have you any stock?"

"No, sah."

"Well, then, you mean that I must furnish you, first, land to cultivate and a house to live in; second, a pair of mules, a wagon, plows, gear and all necessary implements; third, to insure sufficient yield to get my rent, I must furnish you at least \$100 worth of fertilizer and, last, must feed you and your stock until a crop is made."

"Yes, sah."

This colored tenant was not an unusual person in that a great majority were just as poverty-stricken. Before he returned to his family, he had entered into an agreement with the farmer on the conditions which he had requested. If Southern landowners had rented land only to tenants who furnished their teams and were able to finance themselves and their families, some 85 per cent, or more, of the renters would necessarily have become share croppers or wage hands.²⁷

In 1909 the Farmers' National Congress held its annual convention in Raleigh, North Carolina. At this meeting, as reported approvingly by the *Southern Planter*, the delegates adopted a resolution in which they deplored the disintegrated Southern rural labor system, recognized the great amount of impoverished land, commended the organizational efforts of the Farmers' National Union, complimented the establishment of demon-

²⁷ "The Renter Tenant," *ibid.*, 69:8 (1911).

stration farms, and urged the cooperative efforts of both landlords and tenants to devise and to inaugurate an improved system of tenant farming in the South. Such a system was to be based upon long-term leases rather than the one-year agreement. Moreover, tenants, especially Negro tenants, should be taught the nature and obligations of a contract. Laborers must be instructed in the science of agriculture, the object of which was to restore fertility to the soil, to increase crop yields and to raise the standards of living for both the tenant and the landlord.²⁸

Tenancy as viewed by a tenant and as seen in contrast by a landowner was presented to the readers of the *Progressive Farmer*. The tenant frequently felt that he was mistreated, that if he made a good crop the landlord would get the profits, that the interest rates which he was charged were exorbitant, and that the cabin in which he had to live was leaky and cold. His many very real grievances were widely known. The landowner, forced to supply the land, the team, the equipment, the fertilizer, the house in which the tenant lived, the clothing, the fuel, and the food for the worker and his family, took all the risk and quite naturally expected profits on his investment. Much could be written on both sides of this question, concluded the *Progressive Farmer*, the proper solution of which was at the very bottom of any real improvement in Southern farming conditions. Other Southern farm papers approved and agreed that finding an equitable solution was a prerequisite to real progress in Southern agriculture.²⁹

Although the race issue was not discussed in all articles on the labor situation, it did become a part of the treatment of the worker-landlord problem. Seldom did an editor, when discussing the Negro agricultural laborer, permit racial bias and prejudice to warp his judgment. One exception to this generalization, however, should be cited. Clarence Poe, from the Birmingham editorial offices of the *Progressive Farmer*, declared his unalterable

²⁸ J. F. Jackson, "The Labor and Tenancy System in Virginia," *Southern Planter*, 70: 1157-1158 (1909).

²⁹ Clarence Poe, "Both Sides of the Tenant Question," *Progressive Farmer*, 27: 911 (1912); John Lee Coulter, "Land Ownership vs. Tenancy in the South," *Southern Planter*, 73: 1168 ff. (1912); L. R. Neel, "The Tenant Farmer," *Southern Agriculturist*, 42: 6 (1912).

opposition to permitting Negroes to move into Southern white communities and ultimately to buy land there. With all apparent seriousness, he urged the legislatures of every Southern state to enact land segregation acts to prohibit Negroes from purchasing land in rural sections settled predominantly by white farmers.³⁰

Poe offered a four-point plan for the improvement of Southern tenants. They should consider themselves as apprentice farmers striving towards eventual farm ownership. They should stick to the farm, aim at eventual ownership, resolve to be land owners; but they should not strive to become owners too soon. Although he offered this plan to the farm worker who desired to improve himself, Poe thought tenancy as it then existed in the South was very discouraging. The credit system actually encouraged tenancy. The rural labor practices augmented soil deterioration. The merchant's crop lien robbed the tenant of what little incentive and thrift he might possess.³¹

A change of attitude toward tenancy by the farm journals came gradually. One of the earliest indications of the change was revealed by the *Southern Ruralist*. In 1924 in commenting on the organization and work of the South Carolina Land Settlement Commission, the *Ruralist* heartily approved the idea of assisting worthy tenants to purchase farms. There were some shiftless, ne'er-do-well tenants but there were thousands of others who, if given proper assistance, encouragement, and supervision, would make thrifty home and farm owners. Definitely, the creation of the State Commission was a step in the right direction.³²

Yet another decade was to pass before several of the other more widely circulated Southern farm papers took this stand upon the elimination of many of the worst evils of tenancy. The *Southern Planter*, by 1936, favored government assistance toward farm and rural home ownership, provided such a program was based upon a sound national

³⁰ Clarence Poe, "An Appeal to White Townsmen and Legislators," *Progressive Farmer* (Ala., Tenn., Miss., Ark. edition), 30: 53 (1915).

³¹ Poe, "Open Letter to the White Renters of the South" and "How Lack of Rural Credit Legislation Perpetuates Tenancy and Shiftlessness," *ibid.*, 30: 837; 30: 619 (1915).

³² Cully A. Cobb, "The Tenant Problem," *Southern Ruralist*, 30: 22 (1924).

agricultural policy. Full approval of public aid to support tenants in purchasing farms was announced by the *Southern Agriculturist* in 1939. Again, the *Progressive Farmer* renewed its earlier support of the Bankhead-Jones Tenant Purchase Act. Although in favor of this law as a policy, the journal opposed the provision which prohibited an extenant from building his own house and thereby saving the cost of contractor and labor.²²

The tenant system was recognized by all significant farm papers as an outstanding problem. In the early part of the century, these journals were concerned primarily with the one-year tenant-landlord contract which made the labor supply uncertain, with the inability of the landowner to realize a fair return for his land and capital, and with the adverse effect on soil fertility of incompetent tenant farming. By 1940 these periodicals were telling their readers repeatedly that many farm tenants would make successful farmers if they were given proper assistance.

²² "Home Ownership," *Southern Planter*, 97:18 (1936); L. R. Neel, "Is F.S.A. Moving Fast Enough?" *Southern Agriculturist*, 69:8 (1939); Tait Butler, "We May Be Wrong, But Are We?" *Progressive Farmer* (Ky., Tenn. edition), 54:5 (1939).

All journals apparently accepted, as a proper governmental function, the advancement of financial aid to tenants to become landowners. Solid editorial support was given to all agencies of the government that were engaged in rural rehabilitation in the South. It was convincingly clear that in dealing with tenancy, these farm papers were generally biased in favor of Southern white farmers. Moreover, in supporting programs to enable tenants to become farmers, more than one of these journals desired to confine such public aid to white tenants of the South. This was especially true of the *Progressive Farmer*.²³

The Southern rural press reached an increasingly large number of readers during the four decades of the twentieth century. With many articles and editorials these periodicals sought to discourage the one-crop system of farming, to improve the productivity of Southern soils, to encourage the sound investment of the Southern farmer's money in tractors, to promote rural electrification, and to cure some of the ills of tenancy. The rural press of the South was, without doubt, influential in the general improvement of Southern farming.

²³ Consult files of the *Progressive Farmer* for the 1930's in Birmingham, Alabama.

PIONEERING POINT FOUR

ROBERT DANIEL

Carnegie Institute of Technology

One cannot read Jonathan Bingham's progress report on Point Four, *Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy*, without being impressed with the immediacy and magnitude of its impact on the peoples of under-developed areas. Crop production in Etawah, India, he reports, doubled in three years; the annual cash income in a Liberian demonstration area increased five times in a few years; while the death rate from all causes was reduced 50 per cent in ten years in the Amazon Basin.¹ Point Four, it is clear, is writing a major chapter in the history of agriculture.

One should point out, however, that while the "bold new program" as President Truman described Point Four in January, 1949, was bold, it was not new. Since 1942 the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, a quasi-official agency of the State Department, had proffered technical cooperation to the Latin Americans. Dramatic as that story is,² the origins of technical assistance go back even further. One aspect of Point Four, that of employing technical advisers and consultants to work with officials of foreign governments, can be traced back well into the nineteenth

¹ Jonathan B. Bingham, *Shirt Sleeve Diplomacy Point 4 in Action* (New York, 1954), 46, 49, 97.

² A. Edward Stuntz, *To Make the People Strong* (New York, 1948).

century.³ The use of agricultural technicians, home economists, and public health workers to increase crop yields, improve home environment, and raise standards of sanitation was pioneered by Seaman A. Knapp and the General Education Board in the United States at the beginning of the present century.⁴ The story yet to be told is of the origins of the first integrated rural improvement program overseas organized in the Macedonian province of Greece in 1928, twenty-one years before President Truman presented his Fourth Point. This precursor of Point Four had three roots: the Country Life Movement, the missionary movement, and the incorporated philanthropic foundation.

Founded early in the twentieth century, the Country Life Movement was an expression of concern over the impact of industrial society on agriculture. One phase of the movement sought to glamorize rural life, while another phase promoted scientific agriculture. In this latter connection the movement endorsed Seaman Knapp's work and agitated for an agricultural extension service subsidized by Congress.

By 1914 the methodology of rural improvement work was sufficiently refined to be tried abroad, but no American group was prepared to initiate such work at that time. American agriculturists were occupied with organizing an agricultural extension service under the newly enacted Smith-Lever Act. For nearly half a decade the World War hampered overseas work. Moreover, the only overseas American group capable of initiating such a program, the missionaries, embraced a philosophy not conducive to successful extension work. Although the missionaries were dedicated to good works, they found it difficult to believe that natives could be trained for positions of leadership. Not until the 1920's did this attitude change. The new viewpoint insisted that missionaries must admit the natives to partnership in their work or their power to serve native groups would be lost.⁵

The Macedonian demonstration developed out of relief work conducted by American

³ Merle Curti and Kendall Birr have explored this subject. Their findings are published in *Prelude to Point Four* (Madison, 1954).

⁴ Russell Lord, *The Agrarian Revival: A Study of Agricultural Extension* (New York, 1939).

⁵ Laymen's Foreign Missions Inquiry, *Rethinking Missions* (New York, 1932), 16.

missionaries in the Near East during and after the First World War. In 1915 the Turks renewed their periodic persecution of their Armenian and Greek subjects. American missionaries, led by Dr. James L. Barton, senior secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, organized a relief program eventually incorporated as the Near East Relief. This relief work continued on into the early 1920's as Turkey was rent by civil war.⁶ In the efforts to bring relief work to a close and permit the missionaries to resume full-time mission work a rural improvement program was formulated. The chief organizer was Barton.

Barton's interest in rural improvement work was aroused initially by Kenyon L. Butterfield, a major leader in the Country Life Movement. For years Butterfield acted as Barton's advisor on the rural missionary work of the American Board. But until 1923 there were two major obstacles to an effective rural improvement program in the Near East. First, there was war. Not until 1923, when the war in Turkey was concluded by the Lausanne Treaty, could a new program be introduced in the Near East. Secondly, not until the Lausanne Conference did Barton embrace the new missionary philosophy.⁷ The Lausanne Conference thus marked a decisive turning point. Barton and the other officers of the Near East Relief eagerly sought to conclude their alms-giving. At this point Butterfield, as a member of Near East Relief's agricultural committee, proclaimed that ameliorative relief work was inefficient. "You cannot help people very long by giving them food," he asserted. "You must teach them to produce it through fundamental industries, of which agriculture is the first."⁸ Barton confessed that as a result of Butterfield's influence, he was becoming a "crank on the subject of the rural approach" in mission work.⁹ He might

⁶ James L. Barton, *The Story of Near East Relief* (New York, 1930), records this story.

⁷ For a contrast in Barton's point of view see Barton to the American Board, November 22, 1922, in the American Board Papers, Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Barton to Henry Cabot Lodge, September 13, 1923, in the American Board Papers.

⁸ Near East Relief Form Letter, June 2, 1925, in William W. Rockwell Papers, Union Theological Seminary, New York City.

⁹ Barton to Butterfield, November 18, 1925, in American Board Papers.

have added that he was becoming receptive to the idea that a long-range program of rural improvement ought to be instituted in the Near East. Since the missionaries, long occupied with relief work, were anxious to resume full-time mission work, Barton recognized that a new organization would be required to conduct rural improvement programs. Such an organization could be begun with the patrons of the Near East Relief.

The first specific plans which led to the Macedonian project were formulated by Paul Monroe, Rudolf R. Reeder, and James I. Vance. Monroe, an educator especially interested in the problems of education in other areas of the world, Reeder, an expert in child welfare work, and Vance, a prominent clergyman, were sent by Near East Relief in 1924 to study the relief work. Their report contains the first suggestions of a rural improvement program. Reeder told the relief organization that their objective ought to be to help people "through their own agencies rather than directly by an American organization."¹⁶ The report further suggested the introduction of public health nurses into the "dark, unsanitary, dreary abodes" of Near East villages. A model house built of materials at hand was proposed to serve as a center of operations for "workers whose business it shall be to lift the life of the village to the level of this home."¹⁷

The most important contributor to the new philosophy was Thomas Jesse Jones. After years of experience at Hampton Institute and later as Education Director of the Phelps-Stokes Fund, Jones was thinking about the "elements of knowledge and training necessary to a complete and effective civilization."¹⁸ He warned Barton against reliance upon formal education and against the notion that the reformer can do the reforming. The function of the philanthropist, Jones maintained, was to initiate, stimulate, or illustrate "types of service." He felt that any effort to modify the standards of a rural populace must minister to all sectors of the culture or fail.¹⁹ While Jones was teaching Barton a philoso-

phy of philanthropy, Ora S. Morgan, Professor of Agriculture at Columbia University, instructed him in the principles of agricultural education. Morgan in 1927 counseled Barton that "plow-handle farmers" learned most readily from workers who brought the findings of the experiment stations out to the fields.²⁰

The combined influence of Butterfield, Monroe, Reeder, Vance, Jones, and Morgan moved Barton to action. He induced Near East Relief to launch a demonstration project immediately in Macedonia and interested some of the patrons of the Near East Relief in organizing the Near East Foundation which would assume support of the Macedonian demonstration and such other projects as opportunity and finances permitted. Barton was chosen vice-president of the Foundation; Jones served as chairman of the program committee of which Morgan and Monroe were also members.

The task of organizing and directing the Macedonian program fell to Harold B. Allen. A native of up-state New York, Allen brought to the project experience in vocational education and agricultural extension as well as two years' work in the Near East. He commenced exploratory work in Macedonia in October 1928. He tested both vocational and extension techniques before adopting extension principles. In Allen's hands the Foundation's policies have followed the principles enunciated by Jones. Work usually started by encouraging the farmer to adopt more productive techniques and thereby increase his cash income. Having secured his confidence, sanitary reforms and a home management program were instituted. Finally, to make rural life more satisfying, a recreation program featuring organized games and reading rooms was started.²¹

The scope of the Macedonian project was modest. In and of itself it was not expected to revolutionize the practices of all Greek farmers. It was set up as a pilot project, that is in an area of fifty-four contiguous villages, six agriculturists each serving nine communities were to create a change in the level of living so significant that it could not fail to

¹⁶ Paul Monroe, R. R. Reeder, and James I. Vance, *Reconstruction in the Near East* (New York, 1924), 36-37.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹⁸ Thomas Jesse Jones, *Essentials of Civilization* (New York, 1929), 110-111.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, xxiv-xxv.

²⁰ O. S. Morgan, "Summary of Agricultural Program for Near East Relief," in *Near East Relief Docket*, February 11, 1927, in Rockwell Papers.

²¹ Harold B. Allen, *Come Over Into Macedonia* (New Brunswick, 1942).

command the attention of the Greek government. The ultimate goal was to induce the Ministry of Agriculture to organize similar projects throughout Greece. The Foundation's job, then, was twofold: to devise an effective, but inexpensive, rural improvement program and to train a native cadre to direct and extend the work once it was adopted by the Ministry.

Rapport with the ever polite, but often skeptical, peasant was established by "service-type projects" in which the itinerant agriculturist helped the peasant mix sprays, inoculate poultry, or save a cow from bloat. As the peasant's confidence was won the Foundation shifted to long-term, self-perpetuating programs to produce higher farm incomes and better living conditions for farm families. At the same time it was necessary for the American staff to adapt their American experience to native conditions. In general the period of trial and error experimenting lasted from the fall of 1928 to the spring of 1931.

Although programs were devised for each age group, the major focus was on the peasant farmer and his wife. "Cooperating farmers," at least one to a village, were enlisted by the agriculturists to demonstrate one or more specific innovations in the care of livestock or crops. Ultimately village agricultural committees were organized which worked out specific programs for their communities. Monetarily the greatest gains came through inducing farmers to substitute cotton and alfalfa for corn and sesame, in planting fallow land in vetch, or in using better seed for wheat. A ten to twenty per cent increase in income from each of these innovations was usual. Community cooperation spurred by the Foundation also brought gains. By inducing communities to buy a purebred bull, cattle were up-graded, the year-old offspring of the purebred bulls selling for three to four times the price of ordinary native yearlings. Large-ly through better feeding, the number of cows calving tripled in three years.²⁸

Increasing the cash income of the peasant made him willing to try other ideas and able to afford those innovations requiring small capital expenditures. The Foundation's agriculturists organized community recreation programs, occasional drama groups, commun-

ity reading rooms, and Future Farmers Clubs. Although these activities brought no financial rewards to participants, they did enrich village life. One Foundation worker specializing in sanitary engineering helped communities to safeguard their village water supply and to dig sanitary latrines, thereby reducing intestinal diseases. A malaria control program, emphasizing the draining or oiling of all stagnant water, cut the number of working days lost to that disease over 95 per cent in five years.²⁹

Confidence in the Foundation also permitted the starting of home demonstration centers staffed by a public health nurse and a home economist. Unmarried girls were assisted in planning their trousseaus and organized into classes on sewing, cooking, and other elements of home making; married women were also taught child care. Improved infant care featuring bi-weekly baths, the cessation of swaddling, and regular check-ups at well-baby clinics cut infant mortality from nine deaths among forty-one children in 1932 to one death in thirty-four in 1938.³⁰ What was gained by inducing peasants to use night clothes, to exclude livestock from sleeping quarters, to bathe monthly, or to eat one warm meal a day has no monetary value, but was nevertheless a gain in comfort and health.

Assimilation of the Macedonian demonstration by the Greek government took ten years. The first step came in 1935 when the Ministry of Agriculture designated a portion of the Foundation's demonstration area as a national demonstration area. Next, in 1937, Apostolos Koskinides, the Foundation's sanitation expert, was given a civil service appointment, and the Foundation's work at Makriyalos was made the Macedonian Training Center in Malaria Control. Here Koskinides was to train sanitation specialists to conduct similar work in other parts of Greece. The last step, also in 1937, came when the Greek government reorganized its Ministry of Agriculture and inaugurated an extension service patterned after the Macedonian demonstration. Allen's native counterpart, Basil Moussouras, was appointed director of the new extension service. Other members of the Foundation's

²⁸ Apostolos Koskinides, "What Malaria Control Means to Makriyalos" in *Annual Report of Foreign Director, 1940*, pp. 17-18, in Near East Foundation Library, New York City.

²⁹ Allen, *Come Over Into Macedonia*, 212.

staff received civil service appointments and as with sanitation the Macedonian demonstration became a training ground for extension agents who would introduce new ways of farming in other parts of the country. Incorporation of the Foundation's home demonstration work into the government's extension program was undertaken by Moussouras at the end of the Second World War.¹¹

After more than a quarter century of experience the philosophy of rural reconstruction retains essentially the orientation provided by Thomas Jesse Jones, though Harold B. Allen has refined and structured it. To Jones' four essentials—economic efficiency, home management, health, and recreation—Allen makes one addition, literacy. An effective rural improvement program is dependent upon the presence of literate native leaders capable of disseminating technical knowledge.¹² Experience has additionally indicated that there is an inherent order in which the essentials must be undertaken. Because the peasant operates so close to the line separating subsistence from starvation, Allen found "that any organized effort to raise his standard of life and to win his confidence is most likely to succeed if it begins by improving his farming in simple but practical ways."¹³ Economic betterment is a first requisite not only to captivate interest but is essential if the peasant is to be able to afford the means of health and cleanliness. Health, while second to economic betterment, is still in the first rank of essentials since by freeing the peasant of debilitating ailments, productivity is increased. In the second rank of essentials, but having no particular order, come improved home management, recreation, and literacy. Home management is placed in the second rank because successful work among peasant women is dependent upon first securing the confidence of the male population. Recreation and literacy are placed second because they are not requisites of physical sur-

vival and because the peasant cannot afford them until his income has been increased.

Aside from the refinements of Jones' essentials, Allen's experience has confirmed his emphasis on "bringing about a gradual evolution from without, on starting with the material at hand—tradition-bound minds, primitive conditions and limited resources" This evolution is achieved by "the systematic introduction of a multitude of little improvements."¹⁴ But probably the most important discovery has been that effective programs must be total programs. Neither technical efficiency, sanitation and health, home management, recreation, nor literacy programs alone are sufficient to lift an area out of the underdeveloped category.¹⁵ Even with refinements the philosophy is a guide, not a creed, for Allen insists that no program can be packaged to suit all underdeveloped areas. Programs appropriate to the needs and interests of each country must be experimentally developed and tested.

The philosophy of rural improvement pioneered by Thomas Jesse Jones, Harold Allen, and Near East Foundation, consciously or unconsciously, pervades much of the rural work of Point Four. Largely this is because the Jones-Allen-Near East Foundation philosophy of rural work follows the main trend of contemporary social work. But there have also been points of direct contact. Two of Allen's lieutenants, Clayton Whipple and Ralph Allee, have held administrative posts in the government's technical assistance work, and Oscar Ruebhausen, a director of the Foundation, has served on the International Development Advisory Board, the body which formulates basic policy for Point Four. Most important, the Foundation's work in Syria, Lebanon, and Iran has served as starting points for Point Four activities in those countries. Indeed the Iranian Point Four project, excepting India, is the largest rural improvement program conducted by Point Four. There is little doubt that Point Four is making history, but it is the Macedonian demonstration which can most appropriately be dubbed the "bold new program."¹⁶

¹¹ Robert L. Daniel, *From Relief to Technical Assistance in the Near East* (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1958), is an account of the Foundation's experience in Greece and other parts of the Balkans and the Near East.

¹² Harold B. Allen, *Rural Reconstruction in Action* (Cornell, 1953), 81-95.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 164, 126.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 96-123.

THE ACADIAN GRAIN BANKS OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND JOHN T. CROTEAU

University of Notre Dame

Grain banks, organized among the Acadians of Prince Edward Island in the decade after 1868, were unique credit-granting institutions. Chartered under a covering legislative enactment, the grain banks were highly specialized agencies designed to meet one recurrent community problem, the securing of a certain supply of seed grain on reasonable credit terms. In a society where money was extremely scarce these banks disposed of the monetary problem by conducting the business entirely *in natura*, using the grain itself as a measure of value and as a medium of deferred payment. Semibenevolent and cooperative in character, they probably could not have operated except among a group such as the Acadians where the historical experience had been such as to develop a strong sense of community. There is a record of the existence of twenty-four of these societies; one of the grain banks had a business life of seventy-eight years, from 1869 to 1947.

The Acadian community of Prince Edward Island, prostrate for almost a century after the expulsion of 1758, was beginning to re-establish itself by the middle of the nineteenth century.¹ It was far from affluent, however. Credit was from merchants and they charged the farmers rates of 20 per cent or more.² Credit must have been practically inaccessible to the poorer people. In all likelihood the poor farmers borrowed seed grain from their neighbors. The grain banks were formed to solve in a formal, organized way, the constantly recurring problem of securing seed grain on reasonable terms.

The Acadian grain banks were not public granaries in any conventional sense. They provided storage only for neighborhood groups, not for the public at large; they were managed and controlled through democratic elections and cooperative techniques. But they

operated as banks, charging interest in grain on the grain lent. They were authorized by a comprehensive legislative enactment entitled "An Act for the incorporation of Societies for the sale and distribution of Seed Grain, on credit." This act was introduced on April 4, 1868 and went through the legislature without opposition.³ In debating the bill a member stated:

I do not think there is anything exceptionable in the bill, or anything that we need be apprehensive of. It appears to be a very innocent kind of institution, and, as far as I can see, it is likely to prove a useful one. I hope that in every settlement a similar society will be formed, and that our agriculturists will be more provident of that which is of the greatest value to them—their seed grain. This very year shows how improvident many of them are. They thresh out and run to market with their grain as long as they can get a load sold without looking to the future, and in the Spring they often have to buy similar article at 100 per cent higher price. I think these societies will be very useful and I do not see that any inconvenience can result to any class⁴

The bill became a public bill and was finally passed on April 24, 1868.⁵

The essence of the Act is contained in the preamble and in the first section:

Whereas certain persons in this Island have formed themselves into clubs or societies for the sale and distribution of Seed Grain, on credit, to persons not having the means of procuring the same at seed time, and it is necessary that such clubs or societies as are now formed, or may hereafter be formed for

¹ *Journal of the House of Assembly of Prince Edward Island . . .* (Charlottetown, 1868), 54, 57, 60, 61, 64, 79, 80, 102, 105, 111, 129; *Journal of the Legislative Council of Prince Edward Island . . .* (Charlottetown, 1868), 42-43, 63-64, 100.

² *Debates and Proceedings of the Legislative Council of Prince Edward Island, for the Session Commencing the Fourth Day of March, and Ending the Twenty-Fourth Day of April, 1868* (Charlottetown, 1868), 74.

³ *The Acts of the General Assembly of Prince Edward Island, from the Twenty-Sixth Year of the Reign of Her Most Gracious Majesty Queen Victoria, A. D. 1863, to the Thirty-First Year of the Same Reign, 1868, inclusive* (Charlottetown, 1868), 3: 324-326.

¹ J. H. Blanchard, *Histoire des Acadiens de l'Île du Prince Édouard* (Moncton, New Brunswick, 1927).

² *The Islander*, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, April 1 and 22, 1864.

the said purposes be incorporated from time to time, as such clubs may be formed: Be it therefore enacted by the Lieutenant Governor, Council and Assembly, as follows:

I. Societies or clubs, for the sale of seed grain, on credit, as aforesaid, may be formed by any number of persons, not less than nine in number.

Judging from this, and from the fact that it was the first bill introduced by Joseph Octave Arsenault, the second Acadian to be elected to the provincial parliament,⁶ it would seem that the Act was a codification of an institutionalized operation which had existed for some time among the Acadian people.

The procedure to be followed in signing and registering the certificate of incorporation was set forth in section 2: the certificate was to list the names and the addresses of the members and "the quantity of grain each party has respectively contributed, or intends to contribute" and was to be registered in the office of the Prothonotary. Section 3 stated that the society was not to be deemed established until the certificate had been registered; and section 4 required that a notice of the formation of the society be published in the *Royal Gazette* for three insertions. In impressive legal terminology section 5 gave these societies the powers of a corporation. The remaining five sections were technical. The Act seems to be rather elaborate, considering the small size of the business undertaken by these societies. Possibly the elegance and the formality of the Act gave dignity to the management of and the participation in the work of these societies.

In slightly over a decade following the passage of the act at least twenty-four grain banks were organized. And while incorporation of such societies was open to all on Prince Edward Island, with but one exception—that of the Lot 11, St. Bridget Grain Society—all of these grain banks were formed in Acadian communities. There was at least one grain bank in every Acadian parish. Table I gives a list of the grain banks and their dates of registration, where this could be established. It is possible that other grain banks were formed; two were found that apparently were not registered. The list is lengthy enough, however, to show a widespread participation in these societies within

the Acadian communities. One might estimate that these grain banks provided borrowing facilities for 1,200 to 1,500 farmers, almost the entire Acadian community.

The grain bank was an example of cooperative self-help. A typical society would include from thirty to fifty farmers in a neighborhood. Those who had a surplus of seed grain would "invest" it in "shares" in the society. Ten bushels usually constituted one share. The grain — oats usually, though a little barley and occasionally some wheat were used—would be stored through the winter in a building belonging to the society and in the spring would be lent to farmers who needed seed. For every bushel borrowed, a farmer, after threshing his oats in the fall, would usually return a bushel and a peck. From time to time in order to discourage delinquencies, fines would be imposed if returns were not made before the first of December. The members would take part of the interest as "dividends," although the expenses of operation, delinquencies, and the diversion of part of the grain to a "reserve fund" would take a part of the earnings. The expenses consisted of payments for ordinary repairs and the payment of a nominal sum to the caretaker and bookkeeper. Since the bank would be open only a day or two in the spring and in the fall, the work did not take too much time. Some of the bank buildings are still being used as granaries or for other purposes; they are solid one-story, wooden buildings, approximately 12 by 18 feet in size.⁷

Most of the grain banks had gone out of business by the 1920's. The reason for their abandonment is to be found in the inescapable weakness of the commodity nature of the transaction. The borrower might return the required quantity of grain, but the quality of his repayment could not be controlled. Weed infestation resulted from carelessness on the part of some farmers. Improved commercial seed production and the movement away from trade and barter to cash transactions in agriculture have long since made obsolete these grain banks.

⁶ The descriptive material of this and the following paragraphs was secured from interviews with a number of the older Acadian residents of Prince Edward Island. In the summer of 1954 the author, accompanied by Dr. J. H. Blanchard, the Acadian historian, travelled through the Acadian districts and conducted these interviews.

⁷ Blanchard, *Histoire des Acadiens de l'Île du Prince Édouard*, 56.

TABLE 1
Acadian Grain Banks, Locations, and Dates of Registration, Classified by Parishes

Parish	Name of Society	Location	Date of Registration
EGMONT BAY	Abram's Seed Club	Abram's Village	January 8, 1869 ¹
	St. Joseph Seed Club	St. Chrysostome	February 10, 1869 ²
	Egmont Bay Road Seed Club	Urbanville	May 4, 1869 ³
	St. Gilbert's Seed Club	Lot 14	February 26, 1876 ⁴
MONT CARMEL	Fifteen Point Grain Club	Mont Carmel	February 28, 1869 ⁵
MISCOUCHE	St. Ambrose Seed Grain Society	Lot 15 and 14	June 14, 1873 ⁶
	St. John Seed Club	Miscouche	February 1, 1869 ⁷
	Union Grain Club	St. Nicholas	February 10, 1869 ⁸
TIGNISH	Farmers' Seed Grain Society	Miscouche	January 9, 1879 ⁹
	Ascension Seed Club	Tignish	February 22, 1870 ¹⁰
BLOOMFIELD	St. Felix Seed Club	Lot 2	March 21, 1870 ¹¹
	Tignish Grain Society	Tignish, Lot 1	January 18, 1871 ¹²
	St. Joseph Seed Grain Society	Tignish, Lot 1	January 20, 1871 ¹³
	Nail Pond West Seed Grain Society	Nail Pond West	April 1, 1871 ¹⁴
	Provident Lot 2 Seed Grain Society	Tignish, Lot 2	July 2, 1877 ¹⁵
	Tignish Station Seed Grain Club	Tignish	February 25, 1878 ¹⁶
	Lot 2, St. Joseph Seed Grain Society	Little Tignish	November 16, 1878 ¹⁷
	Cascumpec Seed Club	Cascumpec	September 29, 1870 ¹⁸
	Piusville Seed Grain Society	Piusville, Lot 4	December 6, 1879 ¹⁹
PALMER ROAD	Seed Grain Society	Duvar	—
	Peter Road Seed Grain Society	Tignish, Lot 1	May 10, 1873 ²⁰
RUSTICO	St. John's Union Road, Lot 2, Society	Union Road, Lot 2	December 7, 1878 ²¹
ST. BRIDGET	Cavendish Road Agricultural Society	Cavendish Road	May 4, 1875 ²²
	Lot 11, St. Bridget Grain Society	Lot 11	December 20, 1879 ²³

Unless otherwise indicated, all citations are from the *Royal Gazette of Prince Edward Island*, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.

¹ 2: 492 (January 29, 1869).

² 2: 606 (April 9, 1869).

³ Information from books of society; registration apparently not published.

⁴ 4: 208 (May 6, 1876).

⁵ 2: 560 (March 5, 1869).

⁶ 1: 7 (June 11, 1873).

⁷ 2: 525 (February 26, 1869).

⁸ 2: 607 (April 9, 1869).

⁹ 7: 12 (January 11, 1879).

¹⁰ 3: 1214 (March 4, 1870).

¹¹ 3: 1259 (April 16, 1870).

¹² 1: 210 (February 11, 1871).

¹³ 1: 186 (January 28, 1871).

¹⁴ 1: 288 (April 8, 1871).

¹⁵ 5: 200 (July 7, 1877).

¹⁶ 6: 48 (March 2, 1878).

¹⁷ 6: 808 (November 30, 1878).

¹⁸ 1: 27 (October 5, 1870).

¹⁹ 7: 398 (December 6, 1879).

²⁰ Existence of society established by interviews with local residents; registration apparently not published.

²¹ 1: 1 (May 10, 1873).

²² 6: 322 (December 14, 1878).

²³ 3: 226 (June 5, 1875).

²⁴ 7: 416 (December 20, 1879). This is the only registered society not located in an Acadian parish and where the signers are not Acadians.

The operations of a typical grain bank can be studied in detail from the records of the Egmont Bay Road Seed Club. This society was incorporated in 1869 and was liquidated in 1947. Fortunately the books and records of this society have been preserved and, except for the year 1938, they contain the minutes of all the meetings and the accounting

records of seventy-eight years of continuous operation.¹

This society was located in Urbanville, an

¹ The minute books and the account books of the Egmont Bay Road Seed Club were made available through the courtesy of Mr. John Frank Arsenault, a retired school teacher, who located these records among family papers. These records are to be

area almost entirely inhabited by Acadian farmers. It was organized on May 4, 1869. Management was vested in a committee. Borrowers were charged a peck for every bushel borrowed. Notes were required from each borrower; these were made payable in money, with oats valued at fifty cents per bushel. During the first world war the price was increased to one dollar per bushel. The president of this society was empowered to take legal action to collect these notes, but there is no evidence from the minutes that the society ever went to the courts. In a closely-knit neighborhood group if a farmer had a hard year, his neighbors would not press him for payment. From one hundred to three hundred bushels would remain unpaid every fall.

Eventually most farmers paid up. But for those too poor to pay there was a "relief fund." This existed from the early days of the bank, but was formally set up in 1894 when each shareholder was assessed eight per cent of his stock. This assessment was levied annually. Expenses would also be met by selling oats from the reserve. Expenses were moderate, amounting to twenty-five dollars a year and less in the early years. Often after loans had been made from the "relief fund," the borrower would pay them back out of his crop. The group while practicing charity also tried to impress on the irresponsible the lesser, but nonetheless important, virtue of business responsibility.

While one peck per bushel might at first sight seem to be a high rate of interest—twenty-five per cent, or really fifty per cent if the loan extended only from May to November—the amounts involved were small. The average loan was around thirty bushels. Valued at fifty cents per bushel this loan involved only \$15 in principal and \$8.75 in interest. In addition the borrower had the services of storage, credit accommodation, and the assurance of a seed adapted to local growing conditions. Moreover, the speculative element—such as a high price follow-

placed in the Public Archives of Canada. This and subsequent information about the society comes from its original records. The words "grain bank" appear for the first time in the minutes of the meeting held in 1903.

ing a short crop—was eliminated. Not infrequently the shareholders themselves would be short of seed; then they would borrow from the bank and, as it were, pay themselves interest.

Membership in the Egmont Bay society fluctuated between thirty and forty farmers. There were almost twice as many borrowers as members. Before the 1890's there were seldom more than forty borrowers. The number rose from fifty-three in 1904 to sixty-four in 1910 and to seventy in 1911. The number dropped to forty-six during the prosperity of the first world war and rose to eighty-one in the depression year of 1932. From 1,500 to 1,700 bushels were lent each spring and perhaps 2,000 came back in the fall.

After 1945 a feeling that the bank had outlived its usefulness arose among the membership. A cooperative store had been organized and a credit union had been built to a position where it could care for the credit needs of the people. Weed infestation was becoming more serious. The society was dissolved in 1946—in an orderly way, with six special meetings. After selling the reserve oats and the building, each shareholder received a dividend of \$30. Thus after seventy-eight years of operation the bank was liquidated at a profit.

This detail concerning the Egmont Bay grain bank shows that although the operation was microscopically small, it was handled with care and with sound judgment. One can see in the minutes and accounts of this organization that through three generations it not only furnished a community service, but was also a training school in democratic procedures and in cooperative management techniques. The records of the other grain banks have been lost; but wherever such institutions existed they probably followed a similar procedure and exerted a similar influence.

The Acadian grain bank is one of the curiosities in the history of agricultural credit. It was effective in an economy where money was extremely scarce and where strong bonds of community solidarity existed, but it has long been outmoded in modern commercial society with its highly developed instrumentalities of currency and credit and its relatively mobile community structure.

BOOK REVIEWS

Prelude to Point Four—American Technical Missions Overseas, 1838–1938. By MEALE CURRI and KENDALL BIRK. (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1954, 284 p., \$5.00).

Technical aid programs of the United States—"Point Four" from President Truman's speech of 1949—have attracted a great deal of attention both here and abroad, and have come to be a major feature of U.S. foreign programs. Many people feel that this program offers great possibilities, not only to the people in the countries receiving such aid, but also to the United States, in promoting world peace. Others are less sure, and many would agree that technical aid is neither foolproof nor does it provide all the answers.

This little book presents a scholarly and readable account of earlier technical missions. Every historian knows that every historical event or process has its antecedents, and the authors trace the technical aid programs which preceded Point Four. They limit their consideration to programs involving governments, at least in the receiving country, and hence exclude many private or philanthropic missions. They close their analysis with 1938, and hence exclude all recent missions. Otherwise, their coverage is wide, possibly too wide, for, as will be pointed out later, they include several missions where the technical aid aspect was subordinate to direct action or management of government activities. Within their self-imposed limits, they make an excellent and useful analysis of technical aid programs—one with many suggestions and lessons for today.

The non-historian is impressed with the large number and wide variety of programs in the past. After an introductory chapter, in eight more chapters the authors describe various missions, grouped by country or region where the missions operated, or by general type of mission. A concluding chapter attempts to draw lessons from the experiences described.

A number of early missions were essentially scientific in character—mapping, collecting information, showing other people how to grow crops, etc. They were mostly concerned with agriculture and national resources, but were highly varied in specific content. For the most part, these were relatively simple, in some cases consisting of but one or two professional men. One of the earliest relatively comprehensive missions was a series of specific missions to Japan, in the 1860's and 1870's. New agricultural techniques were introduced, especially on the northern islands. A variety of experts on various aspects of government—customs, postal service, prison administration, international law, and education—also advised the government of Japan.

Two missions that were a testimonial to the integrity and lack of imperialistic ambitions of the United States were those to Liberia in 1909 and to Persia in 1910. In each case, local government was in trouble, feared domination by foreign powers, and turned to the United States as a strong friend whom it could trust. In each case, the technical mission outlined a rather comprehensive program

of reform, and in the case of Persia actually directed its implementation. Each case ended in near failure: Liberia, because the ruling elite was unable to continue the reforms and command the respect of its inland inhabitants; Persia, because of British and Russian opposition, the latter culminating in an ultimatum which forced withdrawal of the technical mission. In each case, the government of the United States was unwilling to back up forcefully the recommendations of its own citizens.

Major adventures for the United States were carried on in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Haiti. In each country, the United States virtually took over all functions of government, and ruled with a military government. We were in Cuba three times—once with General Wood as the military governor in 1899 to 1902, once with Judge Magoon as governor in 1906 to 1909, and once with General Crowder as the real power in government from 1920 to 1922. We controlled Santo Domingo's customs from 1907 to 1940, and a good share of that time actually ran the whole of government. We landed Marines in Haiti in 1915 and governed it by military occupation until 1934. In each country, extremely unstable governments had led to a virtual breakdown of orderly government; in each case, we feared the intervention of some European nation into the Caribbean, which we regarded as our backyard. In each case, American missions established programs of infinitely higher technical quality than those previously existing; and in each case, the reforms failed to stick because they did not reflect the convictions of the people. Some would hesitate to characterize these missions as "technical aid"—their technical aspects were surely subsidiary to their political or administrative features.

Through the 1920's and early 1930's, there was a wide variety and large number of missions, to many countries. Many were essentially financial in character—efforts to help the countries get their finances in good order. The nature of these programs varied from simple advice to essentially direct operation. The countries aided were Mexico, other Central American countries, Persia, China, and Peru, as well as others to a lesser extent. Another series of missions were concerned with health and education—again, largely in Latin America. The United States demonstrated over and over again its ability to control and even to eradicate tropical diseases; but its reforms were not always maintained by the countries concerned. Its educational programs found even less permanent adoption.

The concluding chapter of the book summarizes and seeks to interpret the experiences related. It is pointed out that the great majority of the missions went to Latin America and the Far East. The motives underlying the missions, both as far as the United States and as far as the recipient country were concerned, were highly varied—scientific, commercial, humanitarian, desire to obtain loans, etc. The scope of the missions varied from narrow and specific to comprehensive; in general, the comprehensive ones seemed to have been some-

what more successful. A major factor affecting success of the missions was their personnel; technical competence was common, but understanding of social problems was less general. Sympathy with and friendliness for the people of the country to whom the missions went were highly important but unfortunately not universally found. Experts were weaker in terms of understanding the cultural and social problems of the people whom they sought to help, than in their grasp of the technical problems. In too many cases, they sought to introduce, into different social environments, the systems and methods with which they were most familiar. The authority exercised by the American experts varied from nearly none to almost complete in their sphere; unfortunately, in several cases it was not commensurate with the responsibility which they assumed. American experts in many cases encountered opposition—sometimes locally within the country where they worked, sometimes from other countries who resented what they regarded as intrusions in their spheres of influence.

The authors conclude that measurement of success of the missions is difficult; but that some were relatively successful, others relatively unsuccessful. "Technical missions cannot alone remake the world even if Americans are willing to pour more effort into the task than they have shown any willingness to do in the past. But technical aid can help to achieve some limited but useful ends."

This reviewer would offer three general comments:

(1) The authors mention but do not sufficiently emphasize that the chief problems of technical aid are cultural and institutional, not technical. That is, if the recipients of the aid genuinely understand and knowingly want the changes in their society and culture which will almost surely result from technical assistance, the technical side can be met rather easily; but if they either do not understand the implications of technical aid or do not want to change their ways, then specific technical information is largely irrelevant.

(2) The authors perhaps underestimate the long-run effects of the various technical assistance programs; merely because a reform administration or an unusually able and honest administrator undertakes programs which successors abandon does not mean their efforts were wasted. Once any people have a vision of what can be done, they will never completely ignore it again.

(3) The authors do not mention the philosophical, ethical, moral problem of technical assistance, which is akin to that of religion: does one person or one people have the moral right consciously to try to change the beliefs, values, and culture of another? Or does one who has the revealed truth have the moral right not to share it with another, even if the latter does not want it?

All in all, this is a useful and interesting book.

Marion Clawson, Jerusalem, Israel

The Growth of Physical Capital in Agriculture, 1870-1950. By ALVIN S. TOSTLEBE. (Studies in Capital Formation and Financing, National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 44, New York, 1954, xxi, 98 p., \$1.25).

This is a preliminary report on the agricultural phase of a project of the National Bureau of Economic Research having to do with trends in capital

formation and financing in the United States. Physical assets are classified as land and buildings, implements and machinery, livestock and crop inventories.

United States census reports are the basic data. The data are arranged by 10 regional areas, as follows: The Northeast, Appalachian, Southeast, Lake States, Corn Belt, Delta States, Great Plains, Texas-Oklahoma, Mountain, and Pacific. In general, the basic data are given in terms of both current prices and of real prices (the 1910-14 price level is used as the common denominator for real prices).

The data indicate that in terms of 1910-14 prices, there was a continuous increase in physical assets from \$19.8 billion in 1870 to \$53.7 billion in 1950 except for a small decrease from 1930 to 1940. The average annual increase in physical assets from 1870 to 1920 was 3.0 per cent, while from 1920 to 1950 it was only .26 per cent, but in 1870 much of the Western country was still frontier, so there was a wide variation in the rate of increase from one portion of the country to another.

The investment in machinery was 2.8 per cent of the total in 1870 and 12.1 per cent in 1950, using current dollars in each case. If one adds horses and mules to machinery, the total was 8.1 per cent in 1870 and 12.5 per cent in 1950.

While physical assets grew by 172 per cent between 1870 and 1950, the number of persons engaged in agriculture increased by only one per cent. The result was a steady increase in capital investment per worker throughout the 80 year period. In 1870, capital per worker in 1910-14 dollars was \$2,900; by 1950, it had risen to \$7,800. The smallest gains in capital per worker were in the Northeast and Appalachian regions, already well settled and developed by 1870. The largest gains were in the Great Plains and Mountain Regions, where undeveloped land was abundant and population was sparse in 1870.

The emphasis in the report is on trends in terms of constant dollars, but the author recognizes that fluctuations in current prices profoundly affected capital formation in agriculture and that capital expansion in any given period was financed in current dollars, not in dollars of 1910-14 or of any other non-current period.

While not explicitly stated, probably the author would agree that no conversion of fluctuating dollars to constant dollars suffices to give a picture of the changes in the capital structure of agriculture over an eighty year period when the technology of the earlier period was that of the horse and ox age and the technology of the later period that of the gasoline tractor and associated machines such as combines, corn pickers, cotton harvesters, hay balers, forage choppers, etc., plus electricity, vitamins, vaccines, and trace elements in plant and animal nutrition.

The author concludes, "there is good reason to believe that the trend to ever higher amounts of capital per worker has not yet run its course." He also notes, "In the less prosperous farming regions, low income often made it impossible for farmers to acquire either by cash or credit, capital that might have raised the productivity and the income of farm workers." There is nothing in the data to support or refute the statement. It might as reasonably be inferred that the inherent low produc-

tivity of the less prosperous farming regions was a major cause of the lack of credit. Except for the foregoing statement, as this reviewer sees it, the interpretation of the mass of boiled down data is strictly factual.

William L. Cavert, Director of Research, Farm Credit District of St. Paul.

The Buffalo Hunters: The Story of the Hide Men.
By MARIE SANDOZ. (New York, Hastings House, 1954, xii, 372 p., illus., \$4.50).

Since the publication of *Buffalo Land* by William E. Webb in 1872, J. A. Allen's *History of the American Bison* in 1876, and *The Extermination of the American Bison* by W. T. Hornaday in 1889, a considerable amount of writing has been done on the subject of the American Buffalo. Two of the better, more recent works are *The Hunting of the Buffalo* (1929) by E. Douglas Branch and *The North American Buffalo* (1951) by Frank Gilbert Roe. While Roe's volume is the most complete general account, no definitive work on the subject has as yet been published. Although Miss Sandoz's work will be of some interest to the professional historian, it was written largely for the general reader. It is the second volume of a new series of Americana called the American Procession series, edited by Henry G. Alsberg.

The volume contains fifteen chapters divided into four divisions: The Republican Herd, The Crossing of the Arkansas, Retreat to the Staked Plains, and The Northern Herd. The first division contains five chapters, the second division six and the third and fourth two chapters each. The four page foreword is well done and sets the background for what is to follow. The account is chronological, covering the period from 1867 through the late 1880's. Miss Sandoz presents a great mass of detailed material on the subject, accurate and broad in scope. There are interesting accounts of the physical make-up and the habits of the bison, the environment in which they lived, the life and customs of the Indian tribes in the area, and their treaties with the whites. She doesn't leave out anything. She tells of the location of the great buffalo herds before the coming of the western railroads, of the hunting methods of the Indians who killed only for their needs and did not seriously reduce their numbers. With the coming of the various railroads, the herds were cut to pieces and the plains swarmed with "hide men," who, assisted by the government, slaughtered the animals in enormous numbers, leaving the meat to rot off the bones that were later picked up by the settlers and bone dealers and sold for fertilizer. There are graphic accounts of railroad building, and the life and work of the white hunters along with the activities of such well-known frontier figures as Wild Bill Hickok, Lonesome Charley Reynolds, William F. Cody (Buffalo Bill), and the army leaders Phil Sheridan and George A. Custer.

The materials are not well balanced, the emphasis being definitely upon the southern herds. The account of the northern herd is very incomplete and fragmentary. The bibliography, which is listed for the general reader, might have been a bit more inclusive. Webb's *Buffalo Land*, a very readable account with good illustrations, is available in many libraries. My volume *Frontiers of the Northwest* (1940 and 1950), containing fifty-seven pages of documented material dealing with the northern

herd, should be of interest to the general reader and might have been of some help to the author in bolstering up her section on the northern herd, which is the weakest part of the book. The organization and presentation of the material lack cohesion and the writing is rather choppy in spots. While the fill-in dialogue may add somewhat to general reader interest, it is not acceptable in the methodology of the professional historian.

However, these criticisms are minor matters as Miss Sandoz has obviously accomplished her purpose. She has presented a well-written and detailed account of the western buffalo hunters which will be a valuable contribution to our rapidly growing body of Americana. The format of the volume is attractive and the book is well printed with carefully chosen illustrations. The end papers, showing a map of the western buffalo country and the location of its herds, add to the value of the book. There is no index.

Harold B. Briggs, Southern Illinois University

Main Street on the Middle Border. By LEWIS ATHONROX. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954, xiv, 368 p., illustrations, appendixes, notes, and index, \$6.00).

The role of the country town in American history has been largely neglected. In his study, Mr. Atherton has endeavored to write a "cultural and economic history of midwestern country towns from 1865 to 1950" (p. xvi). This in itself is a large order, since relatively few local studies have been made in this area. Thus, the author has had to break new ground.

The "Middle Border" is defined as the eight states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. One or two towns in each state have been selected, and their newspapers studied. In addition, such source materials as business records, diaries, letters, and autobiographies of residents of the area have been used, together with printed secondary materials and the works of the outstanding regional novelists of these states. From this base, Mr. Atherton has built up a story of small-town life.

Beginning with the early days of the country town, and continuing through to the present day, the author recounts the familiar features of village life from the country store, the livery stable, the barbershop, the circus, Chautauqua, holiday celebrations, and the influence of the McGuffey Readers to the modern changes brought by highways, trucks, fast cars, movies, radio, and television. From isolated communities, with a strong sense of "togetherness," country towns have today been invaded by the city, with a resulting loss of community sense and individualism. The book is attractively printed, illustrated, and bound, but the index is quite inadequate.

The work falls short of its stated goal—a "cultural and economic history of midwestern country towns." The agricultural and economic historian will look in vain for some explanation of the influence of farm on town, and of town on farm. Since the towns studied (some dozen communities in eight states) were selected as examples of "farm service centers" of less than 5,000 population, more emphasis on the economic relations of town and farm would be expected. The cultural and social historian will find nothing new. The culture is described as "rootless," as "new and raw." Can any

culture, no matter how new and raw, be entirely rootless? What of the culture brought to the Middle West by eastern and European immigrants? The historian of immigration will find little attention given to the German and Scandinavian peoples in the Midwest. Two references to Germans are indexed: one to German beer parlors, another to the German Turnverein. No mention is made of the Swedes and Norwegians, who certainly played a role in at least such Midwestern states as Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa.

The danger inherent in writing social history is the temptation to generalise from too little evidence. In many instances the author makes a sweeping generalization, documented by references to single issues of one or two newspapers. From a wide reading in Iowa newspapers from 1860 to 1890, this reviewer could produce contrary evidence in almost every instance.

Before a synthesis of the role of the country town can be made, many local studies are needed. One or two newspapers from one or two towns in each of eight states—towns which may or may not be typical—is too narrow a base for sweeping conclusions. The sociologists have worked in this field; it is time for the historian to approach the problem from his point of view. Fruitful interpretations of the role of the country town on the economy, culture, and even the politics of a region can and should be made before the over-all picture can be presented by one historian. Atherton, covering so wide an area, has pointed the way, both by what he has included and by what he has omitted, to a wide field of needed research.

Mildred Throne, State Historical Society of Iowa

Johnny Appleseed: Man and Myth. By ROBERT PRICE. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1954, xv, 320 p., plates, apps., notes, bibliog., index, \$5.00).

From Robert Price's quarter of a century quest for the "few facts and the multitudinous fancies" concerning Johnny Appleseed there has emerged a man and a myth—a Middle Western adventurer whose real story outshone the legend, a major national myth which novelists and poets built upon a "symbol of everything good associated with the development of the land."

John Chapman developed early a knack of judging just where the edge of migration would cut into the frontier; it was his life-pattern to start chains of nurseries where settlers would soon be needing them—as on the Allegheny when he was in his twenties, on the Maumee of northwestern Ohio some thirty years later, and, when the Wabash-Erie Canal was begun in 1832, near Fort Wayne—a method of moving his business with the frontier that was altogether unique.

He mingled easily with frontier people, sowing entertaining talk along with his seeds—harrowing accounts of his survival in wilderness winters that became folk tales of his physical prowess. And presently there were added hero tales of his warnings to settlers in the ominous preliminaries of the War of 1812 and reminiscences of the bizarre figure (often with mushpot hat and bare feet) that appeared unexpectedly out of nowhere at lonely cabin

doors to ask for a night's lodging and spread the gospel of Swedenborg. In 1817 these heterogeneous tales suddenly leaped to England, where they were printed in a Manchester tract on a "very extraordinary missionary of the New Jerusalem."

Tales of this peripatetic planter, this "one-man library" of Swedenborgian literature, flourished during the middle years, but it was the last two decades of his life that shaped the symbol. Into this image went everything people had known or heard of him—his benevolences, fantasies of frustrated love, preaching, poverty (the shrewd Yankee actually had sizeable holdings as well as his nurseries), and "queerness." Exaggerated, simplified, and idealized, these traits nourished the myth planted in Manchester—the sense of mission that directed his wanderings; Haley's article in *Harper's* in 1871 gave it national currency; poets Lindsay, the Benets, and Sandburg made it a vehicle of the democratic spirit. Man and myth were a curious illustration of the doctrines he taught—the correspondences between the natural and spiritual worlds, for "the passing of the earthly form was merely the unshackling of the Johnny Appleseed who had already become the reality."

Meticulous research and discriminating logic (in a straightforward style well suited to the subject) have distinguished man from myth without losing their mutual impact. The flowering of the legend has been carefully traced; some readers are sure to wish that this final chapter could have been expanded (even at the expense of documenting the man) to allow fuller scope for the author's ample investigations into the place which the myth occupies in American ideology.

Frank R. Kramer, Heidelberg College

Dakota Territory During The Eighteen Sixties. By HERBERT S. SCHELL. (University of South Dakota, Governmental Research Bureau, Report No. 30, Vermillion, 1954, vi, 97 p.).

This is a concise and careful account of Dakota Territory during the first decade of its history. As such it fills a gap in the bibliography of the northern plains country. Dean Schell has based his narrative upon a considerable range of books, articles, government reports, newspaper files, and the occasional manuscript collection. The reviewer suspects that the author would have been rewarded had he pushed his investigations into those materials of the Department of the Interior, bearing on land disposal and Indian affairs, which are now housed in the National Archives.

The descriptions of the opening of the Territory, of its economic interconnections with adjacent states and territories, and of Indian relations and politics provide a brief but illuminating picture of the political, economic, and social context in which the pioneer agriculturist operated. Those sections dealing with the settlement process and agricultural development are so attenuated, however, that the agricultural historian may wish to turn directly to the articles cited, bearing directly on these subjects. The frontier historian will regret, perhaps, that the materials presented in this little book were not placed in perspective against the general background of the territorial process.

A. G. Bogue, State University of Iowa

NEWS NOTES AND COMMENTS

APRIL 1955 MEETING

The Agricultural History Society, meeting with the Mississippi Valley Historical Association in St. Louis, Missouri, held a meeting of the Executive Committee, a joint session with the Association and the annual business meeting on April 29, 1955. All three meetings were unusually well attended.

The meeting of the Executive Committee, a breakfast session, was attended by members of that committee, chairmen of other committees of the Society, and past presidents. In the absence of the president, Bennett H. Wall presided. The Secretary-Treasurer presented the financial report, which was discussed. The Editor reported upon his activities and then presented his formal resignation, to become effective not later than October, 1956. A resolution expressing appreciation to Mr. Carstensen for his work with the journal was introduced, seconded, and passed. After a discussion of the possibilities of relocating the journal, costs of printing, membership, and related matters, the Committee passed a resolution providing that a committee be named to secure a new editor, investigate the printing situation, and attempt to secure sponsors. The Committee also passed a resolution authorizing the Secretary-Treasurer to make interim arrangements for printing. After discussion, the Committee agreed that the Society's representation on joint councils or committees should be on a revolving basis. The Committee recommended to the president that he appoint a committee to investigate the possibility of joint sessions with additional societies. It recommended to the membership that the proposal for increasing dues be adopted and, if the proposal was adopted, directed the Secretary-Treasurer to make the necessary adjustments with the Economic History Association and authorized him to make equitable arrangements with the British Agricultural History Society for joint memberships.

The joint session of the Mississippi Valley Historical Association and the Society, held at 10:00 a.m., April 29, 1955, had as its theme technology on the farm. The program was arranged by Andrew H. Clark of the University of Wisconsin, George Lemmer of the U. S. Department of Defense, and Mildred Throne of the State Historical Society of Iowa. Earle D. Ross of Iowa State College, in his paper entitled "Retardation of Technology on the Farm Before the Power Age," pointed out that technological change did not come as a revolution but as a gradual movement from area to area and from farm to farm. He discussed the gradual changes in a number of implements, giving particular attention to the development of power sources. His conclusion was that the mechanized, scientific farm marks the passing of the opportunity for diffused farm ownership.

William L. Cavert of the Farm Credit District, St. Paul, in his paper, "The Technological Revolution in Agriculture, 1910-1955," drew a contrast

between 1910 and 1955, showing that the widespread use of tractors, trucks, and automobiles on farms is a comparatively recent development. The gasoline engine, farm electricity, changes in types of crops, use of chemical sprays, use of commercial fertilizers in the Corn Belt, vaccines, and antibiotics have all contributed to the decline in hours of labor needed for growing a given quantity of crops.

In discussing the papers, Clarence H. Danhof, Tulane University, emphasized the difference between productive and unproductive farm enterprises and suggested that a device must be developed for retaining capital in farm operations over a longer period of time. Russell Anderson, Pensacola Junior College, emphasized the development of farm implements and the impetus given such development by wars.

Following the joint session, Bennett H. Wall called the business session to order. The reading of the minutes was dispensed with and the Secretary-Treasurer presented his financial report. The Editor presented his report and due notice was taken of his resignation. Mr. Kellar offered a resolution expressing the thanks of the Society to Vernon Carstensen and Wayne D. Rasmussen for their activities on behalf of the Society, which resolution was seconded and passed.

The proposed amendment to the by-laws, increasing annual dues from four dollars to five dollars, was read and, after a brief discussion, passed. A number of suggestions were offered for increasing interest and membership in the Society. Mr. Kemmerer suggested that efforts be made to increase college library subscribers and to hold joint meetings with the Mid-West Economic Association and other regional groups. Mr. Kerschner suggested that the Society attempt to reach farm leaders who were not professional historians, while Mr. McDonald suggested implement manufacturers and power companies as possible sources of support.

Mr. Hesseltine, Chairman of the Edwards Memorial Awards Committee reported that the two awards for 1954 were to Thomas LeDuc for his paper on "State Disposal of the Agricultural College Land Scrip," and to Paul C. Henlein for his paper on "Cattle Driving from the Ohio Country, 1800-1850." Both authors were present and received the congratulations of the group, after which the meeting was adjourned.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT, JANUARY 1, 1954 TO DECEMBER 31, 1954 of the AGRICULTURAL HISTORY SOCIETY

Amt. in checking account, Jan. 1, 1954	... \$1,470.78
Amt. in savings fund, Interstate Bldg.	
Assn., Jan. 1, 1954 1,596.20

Receipts to December 31, 1954:

Sale of back numbers.....	\$ 585.21
Sale of reprints.....	216.33
1952 dues.....	16.00
1953 dues.....	189.00
1954 dues.....	1,239.00
1955 dues.....	841.60
1956 dues.....	16.00
1957 dues.....	4.00
Life membership.....	117.50
Advertisement.....	40.00
Edwards Memorial Fund.....	21.00
Contributions	
for illustrations.....	230.37
Reimbursement	
for drafting costs.....	61.25
Gifts.....	4.00
Interest.....	48.24
Total Receipts.....	3,579.50
Total to be accounted for.....	6,646.48
Expenditures to December 31, 1954:	
Waverly Press, printing 4 issues of Agricultural History.....	\$2,540.98
Waverly Press, reprints.....	208.21
Letterheads and envelopes.....	13.01
Refund on cancelled subscriptions.....	10.75
Payment on joint dues to Economic History Association.....	114.00
Postage.....	127.24
Edwards Memorial Fund Awards.....	100.00
Bonds for Secretary-Treasurer.....	10.00
Drafting.....	61.25
Total Expenditures.....	3,185.39
Amt. in checking account, Dec. 31, 1954.....	*1,816.65
Amt. in savings fund, Interstate Bldg. Assn., Dec. 31, 1954.....	1,644.44
Total accounted for.....	6,646.48

* Of this total, \$237.37 comprised the Edwards Memorial Fund.

EDWARDS MEMORIAL AWARDS

As the Edwards Memorial Awards enter their third year, the Executive committee wishes to emphasize that the student award will be made for the best paper submitted during 1955, whether or not that paper is published during the year. All papers submitted by those in the course of taking a degree will be considered both for the award and for publication. Papers to be so considered should be accompanied by a statement indicating the student status of the author and should be addressed to the Editor, Vernon Carstensen, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison 6, Wisconsin.

REPRINTS

The Agricultural History Society has available reprints of all articles in the April and July issues of the journal at 25¢ per single copy, with additional copies at 5¢ each. Many other prints are available on the same terms. Send orders or requests for lists to the Secretary-Treasurer, Wayne D. Rasmussen, U. S. Agricultural Marketing Service, Washington 25, D. C.

ACTIVITIES OF MEMBERS

Donald J. Berthrong of the University of Oklahoma discusses "Andrew Jackson Turner, Work Horse of the Republican Party," in *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, 38:77-86 (Winter, 1954-55).

James C. Bonner of the Georgia State College for Women is the author of "The Historical Basis of Southern Military Tradition," *Georgia Review* (Spring, 1955).

Harry Brown, Michigan State University, is the author of "The Fleece and the Loom: Wool Growers and Wool Manufacturers during the Civil War Decade," in *The Business History Review* (March, 1955).

John C. Ellickson of the U. S. Agricultural Research Service discusses "Social Security for Farmers," in *Agricultural Finance Review* (November, 1954).

John P. Harrison of the National Archives discusses "Science and Politics: Origins and Objectives of Mid-Nineteenth Century Government Expeditions to Latin America," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 35:175-202 (May, 1955).

James C. Malin of the University of Kansas has published Part 2 of his "Notes on the Writing of General Histories of Kansas," in *Kansas Historical Quarterly*, 21:264-287 (Winter, 1954).

Arthur G. Peterson has transferred from the Office of Secretary of Defense to the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, with headquarters at the National Institute of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Dr. Peterson, formerly with the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, was Secretary-Treasurer of the Agricultural History Society, 1939-44 and President, 1944-45.

Wayne D. Rasmussen of the U. S. Agricultural Marketing Service is giving a reading course in the history of American agriculture at the American University during the summer of 1955.

George Rogers Taylor of Amherst College has been appointed editor of the *Journal of Economic History*.

Henry C. Taylor, Washington, D. C., revisited England in the summer of 1954. He discusses "Food and Farm Land in Britain," in *Land Economics*, 31:24-34 (February, 1955).

AMERICAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION

The American Economic Association, founded in 1885, is an organization with a membership of over seven thousand persons interested in the study of economics or the economic phases of social and political questions. Its purpose is the encouragement of perfect freedom of economic discussion. The Association as such takes no partisan attitude, nor will it commit its members to any position on practical economic questions.

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Evanston, Illinois

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The Federal Economic Review

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University of Karachi, Pakistan
Editor: PHILIP C. NEWMAN, PH.D.

Volume 1

Autumn 1954

No. 1

Central Banking in Pakistan.....	ZAHID HUSSAIN
The Capital Levy, Zakat, and Fiscal Reform.....	PHILIP C. NEWMAN
Some Economic Implications of Pakistan's Membership of the Commonwealth.....	I. A. MUKHTAR
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Book Reviews	

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